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In the face of the remarkable growth of international organizations
in the last fifty years, scholars in multiple disciplines have sought to
explain why and how states cooperate. Dispute resolution is one of the
most crucial components of international cooperation. Examining the
dispute resolution regimes of international organizations in light of
these theories can inform and help reform these evolving regimes.I
1. With this article, I hope to answer the continuing call to integrate law with other
disciplines, including political science, international relations theory, and economics. See,
e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for Interna-
tional Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
205 (1993) [hereinafter A Dual Agenda]; Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and
International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM.
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I. IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION REGIMES
The creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") 2 and the World Trade Organization ("WTO")3 in this dec-
ade has clearly shifted the focus on international trade from bilateral
agreements to multilateral and global agreements. This historic trend
towards the growth of international trade organizations was accelerated
by the apparent success of the European Union's efforts in the 1990's to
revitalize the European economy and create the internal market of
1992.' The drive to mimic the European Union ("EU") (and combat its
strength) was then seen in the proliferation of regional organizations
such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR,6 Association of Southeast Asian Nations
("ASEAN"),7 and the proposed Free Trade of the Americas.8
J. INT'L L. 367 (1998) (noting the increasing number of times that international lawyers and
political scientists have drawn on each other's work).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter
NAFTA].
3. Agreement Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO].
4. There is no question that trying to imitate the European Community ("EC") during
the 1970s or 80s hardly seemed attractive. The paralysis of the European Commission and
the member states is well-documented and the lack of progress in breaking down barriers led
to accusations of "Euroscleroris." See, e.g., JOHN MCCORMICK, THE EUROPEAN UNION 183-
84 (1996). The focus on Europe 1992 and renewed agenda coming from the Single European
Act in 1986 finally broke the EC from this pattern. See George A. Bermann, The Single
European Act: A New Constitution for the Community?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529
(1989); Andrew Moravscik, Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community, 45 INT'L ORG. 19 (1991) [hereinafter
Negotiating the Single European Act].
5. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C224) 1. The EU was built on
the original European Economic Community. Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
6. MERCOSUR stands for Common Market of the South. It entered into force in 1992
following the adoption of the Treaty of Asunci6n in 1991. Treaty Establishing a Common
Market, Mar. 26, 1991, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., 30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter Treaty of Asun-
cion]. The common market envisioned by MERCOSUR has not yet been established. See
Cherie O'Neal Taylor, Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an
Agent for Deepening Integration: NAFTA and MERCOSUR?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 850
(1996-97) [hereinafter Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst].
7. See Chad Bowman, Southeast Asia Leaders Adopt 'Hanoi Plan' That Speeds Trade,
Investment Liberalization, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 2122 (1998); Jason Gutierrez, ASEAN
Members Decide to Keep Free-Trade Target Despite Crisis, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 1299
(1998); see also Nobuo Kiriyama, Institutional Evolution In Economic Integration: A Con-
tribution To Comparative Institutional Analysis For International Economic Organization,
19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 53 (1998) (applying economic analysis to ASEAN).
8. See Rossella Brevetti, FTAA Negotiating Groups Converge on Miami for Official
Talks, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 1510 (1998); Frank J. Garcia, "Americas Agreement"-An In-
terim Stage in Building the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
63 (1996); Frank J. Garcia, Decisionmaking and Dispute Resolution in the Free Trade Area
[Vol. 20:697
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At the same time, and no doubt in conjunction with the growth of
trade organizations, international trade has become increasingly impor-
tant both economically and politically. With each year, states find that
an increasing part of their economy is dependent upon international
trade, and the ripple effect of economic troubles has become more and
more apparent even in the last year.9 With the growing importance of
international trade and investment, these issues have taken a front row
seat in domestic politics. The debate over Fast Track authority in the
United States,' ° the battle over International Monetary Fund ("IMF")
programs in Asia," the French agricultural strikes,'2 the uproar over mad
cow disease, 3 and domestic support for defiance vis-a-vis the interna-
tional economic community" are but a few examples of the passion
international trade can evoke on the domestic political scene.
of the Americas: An Essay in Trade Governance, 18 MICH J. INT'L L. 357 (1997)
[hereinafter Essay in Trade Governance].
9. See David Barboza, Dow Up 23.17 As Late Rally Salvages Prices, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 1998, at DI; Federal News Service, Hearing of the House Banking and Financial Serv-
ices Committee Subject: Global Economic Problems Chaired By Representative Jim Leach,
September 14, 1998; Nicholas D. Kristof, World Ills Are Obvious, the Cures Much Less So,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at Al (discussing how economic problems in the Far East impact
the U.S. economy); Seth Mydans, Crisis Aside, What Pains Indonesia is the Humiliation,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at A9; Seth Mydans, The Thai Gamble: Devaluing Currency to
Revive Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1997, at Dl; Alessandra Stanley, In Dark Times, Rus-
sia's Economic Chief Looks on Bright Side, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at A13; The World
Economy: Could It Happen Again?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 20, 1999, at 19.
10. Fast Track authority grants the President the ability to negotiate trade agreements
without any amendments by the Senate during ratification. On the Fast Track battle see Mi-
chael Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to Beyond, 29 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L. L. & ECON. 687 (1996); Cherie O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy,
and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA Turned Into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INTL.
L. & EcON. 1 (1994); Charles Tiefer, "Alongside" the Fast Track: Environmental and Labor
Issues in FTAA, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 329 (1998); Jill Abramson with Steven Green-
house, Labor Victory on Trade Bill Reveals Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1997, at A l; Peter
Baker & Paul Blustein, Clinton Searches for Middle on 'Fast Track', WASH. POST, Sept. 11,
1997, at A8; 'Fast Track' is Derailed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1997, at A26; and The Fast-
Track Fight, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1997, at A24.
11. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Has the I.M.F. Cured or Harmed Asia? Dispute Rages Af-
ter Months of Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1998, at D3; John W. Head, Lessons From the
Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of the IMF and the United States, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'v., Spring 1998, at 70; see generally Rumu Sarkar, The Legal Implications of Financial
Sector Reform in Emerging Capital Markets, 13 AM. U. INT'L. L. REv. 705 (1998).
12. See Maggie Urry, Farmers Hope for a Richer Harvest, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Apr.
30, 1998, at 7; Craig A. Whitney, World Briefing: France: Farmers Protest in Paris, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at A8; World News Briefs: Belgium: Farmers Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 1999, at A6.
13. See John Darnton, Europe Orders Ban on Exports of British Beef, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 1996, at Al; Alan Cowell, Disease Tests European Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
1996, at A8.
14. See Mark Landler, Malaysia Says Its Much-Criticized Finance Strategy Has
Worked, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, at AI0.
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These events have spurred and accompanied the evolution of a vari-
ety of different dispute resolution regimes. These regimes evolved from
differences in the international organizations themselves, their members
and their goals. As the number of international organizations continues
to grow, it has become increasingly important to categorize and analyze
these dispute resolution regimes. While it sometimes appears as if each
new international organization is reinventing the wheel in trying to fig-
ure out the balance between negotiation and adjudication, between
supremacy over domestic laws and sovereignty of member states, some
guidelines and general rules can be detected. Systematizing the regimes
of dispute resolution and understanding their differences and unique
balances will assist in both advising new organizations in setting up
their dispute resolution systems and advising existing organizations on
improving their dispute resolution mechanisms.
Furthermore, as more international trade organizations establish
dispute resolution regimes that move away from negotiation, interna-
tional law is being created in a way wholly different from the traditional
model of international law. International treaties and customary law"
are the two primary sources of international law. 6 Yet today, decisions
handed down by international courts such as the European Court of Jus-
tice ("ECJ"), or other adjudicatory bodies, such as the WTO, are
increasingly prominent on the international landscape and in relations
between countries. These decisions, however, are ranked as the fourth
source in international law 7 and have not been traditionally considered
as binding as treaties or customary law. 8 One could argue that decisions
issued by organizations created by treaties (i.e., the EU, WTO, NAFTA)
are law under the original treaty, but the scope and breadth of these de-
cisions seem to stretch this argument to the limit. We are faced with a
pattern of extensive judicial lawmaking, yet an international consensus
on the force of this law is lacking.
It is crucial that we examine the methods used to make these inter-
national decisions. While much focus has been given to the legislative
processes in international organizations," much more attention is
15. Customary law is created by state practice and opiniojuris, the legal belief that such
state action is legally required. Prior to their codification in treaties, laws concerning such
diverse subjects as maritime boundaries, diplomatic immunities and actions for treaty breach
were all customary laws.
16. U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, Chapter II, Article 38.
17. Id.
18. MARK W. JANis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (1993).
19. See, e.g., Negotiating the Single European Act, supra note 4, at 7 (focusing on how
states negotiated qualified majority voting rules of the Single European Act); Joel Tracht-
man, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International Economic Organization:
Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 Nw. J.INT'L L. & Bus. 470, 543-549 (1996-
[Vol. 20:697
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needed at this stage of lawmaking. Increasingly, treaties have left their
interpretation to some form of adjudicatory body rather than resorting to
amending the treaty or creating new law legislatively. Thus, studying
dispute resolution regimes and the variations that exist is a necessary
first step in assessing how this new type of international law is being
created. 0
This article first explores five legal factors that differentiate be-
tween the types of dispute resolution regimes. These five factors-direct
effect, standing, supremacy, transparency and enforcement-are not
exhaustive. However, it is the differences in each of these factors and
the combination of these factors that have dictated the form and func-
tion of the four current dispute resolution regimes currently in use by
international trade organizations. Direct effect, standing, and supremacy
are derived from legal theories of integration. When legal scholars have
examined the development of international organizations, these factors
have been isolated as determining the level of "constitutionalization" of
the organization" and the extent to which dispute resolution is inte-
grated into the domestic legal fabric. Direct effect measures the scope of
rights granted to private actors. Standing, the opposite side of the same
coin, determines whether rights under the agreement can be asserted by
private actors. Supremacy reflects member states' willingness to relin-
quish sovereignty. Transparency refers to the clarity of procedures and
decisions, and the extent to which they are made public. It has become
an important factor in assessing the legitimacy of international organi-
zations and clearly contributes independently to a regime's
effectiveness.22 Finally, enforcement measures the effectiveness of any
international organization by focusing upon its compliance record.
Next, this article introduces a four-part clarification of dispute
resolution regimes. I call these four regimes "Negotiation," "Investment
Arbitration," "International Court," and "Supranational Adjudication."
The Negotiation Regime is the place to start in analyzing dispute reso-
lution. On the continuum of each of the legal factors outlined, it is
97) [hereinafter Theory of the Firm] (discussing the economic impact of voting rules changes
in the Single European Act); Stephen Zamora, Voting in International Economic Organiza-
tions, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 566 (1980).
20. For additional literature on judicial versus legislative lawmaking, see GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
21. See Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst, supra note 6; Joseph H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991) [hereinafter The Transformation of
Europe]. For a slightly different approach to constitutionalization, see Ernst-Ulrich Peters-
mann, Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 398
(1996-97).
22. See, e.g., Juliet Lodge, Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy, 32 J. COMM.
MKT. STUD. 343 (1994).
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clearly the weakest in all of the factors.23 Other regimes have evolved
depending on how the organization has moved along the range on each
of these variables. In the Investment Arbitration Regime, direct effect
and standing for private actors is provided. In addition, enforcement is
through domestic courts and remains relatively easy compared to other
adjudication options. In Investment Arbitration, however, supremacy is
limited to a single decision, transparency is optional, and remedies are
limited. In the International Adjudication Regime, there is supremacy
under international law, transparency of decisions, and, increasingly, a
wider range of remedies. Again, however, this regime provides no direct
effect, no standing for private actors, and enforcement that is limited to
international law. The Supranational Court Regime moves along the
continuum in all of these factors, providing direct effect, standing for
private actors, supremacy, transparency, and enforcement with strong








After reviewing the types of regimes, the next two sections in the
article attempt to assess the effectiveness of current dispute settlement
regimes. These sections turn first to variables from several disciplines,
including law, political science and economics. After these theories and
the variables that are most important to them have been identified, sec-
tion four of this article then takes the dispute resolution regimes and
studies them in light of the theoretical variables. This examination pro-
23. Many would argue that negotiation is the most effective way to resolve disputes be-
cause it relies on the relative power of states. The legal factors discussed in this article,
however, measure the level of constitutionalization or judicialization of the regime. By this
measure, the Negotiation Regime is the weakest.
[Vol. 20:697
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vides an assessment of which regimes will be more effective given cer-
tain combinations of these variables and offers an analysis of which
theory seems to best explain the current combination of dispute resolu-
tion regimes.
In section five of the article, I look at directions for future work in
this area. I first look at problems and weaknesses with this regime
analysis. For one, this study uses only one type of organization, which
may make the lessons less applicable to other international organiza-
tions. Second, some of these regimes are based on emerging
organizations so that there are very few cases available for testing and
assessing. Third, this study assumes that the legal factors of each dis-
pute resolution regime are each of equal value and also does not
distinguish in importance between the theoretical variables listed in part
three. Finally, this study assumes that the legal factors by which each
regime is established are in fact the product of rational negotiation. In
fact, as the EU demonstrates, the dispute resolution system could evolve
differently and beyond the point where the original drafters of the or-
ganization intended.
The final component of section five suggests additional areas of re-
search and study that would be useful in further developing this regime
analysis. The lessons from having performed the regime analysis, even
with its weaknesses, ultimately lead to questions about where we go
from here. What can we learn about the evolution of dispute resolution
systems? What advice can we provide to emerging international trade
organizations? What further research should be done in order to draw
lessons across legal disciplines from human rights, the environment, and
other areas?
II. DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN DISPUTE RESOLUTION REGIMES
After reaching an understanding as to why the study of dispute
resolution regimes is necessary and timely, we now turn to an examina-
tion of the legal factors that differentiate between these regimes. I have
previously used these legal factors in an analysis of private involvement
in international trade dispute resolution.24 Here we use these factors in
order to categorize existing dispute resolution regimes.25
24. See Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy in Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in
International Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L. EcON. L. 587 (1998).
25. The factors listed in this section are no doubt incomplete. Other factors of inquiry
could include whether the decisions have precedential value, whether the decision is subject
to review or appeal, and whether the panel is rotating or standing. See e.g., Laurence R.
Summer 1999]
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A. Legal Factors Differentiating Between Dispute Resolution Regimes
1. Direct Effect of Rights
In looking at the four dispute resolution regimes, one of the legal
factors that differs among the regimes is whether or not private actors
have rights under the treaty establishing the trade agreement. The
phrases "self-executing" and "direct effect" are used synonymously and
indicate those dispute resolution regimes where private actors do have
rights granted under the treaty.26 When private actors are granted direct
effect of rights under the dispute resolution regimes, these actors can
then protect their trade rights in their own domestic courts or in multi-
national fora.27
Most current trade agreements do not provide for direct effect of
rights. Historically, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties
("FCN Treaties") were considered self-executing in the United States. 8
Ironically, although trade agreements have become more important-
covering and affecting more sectors of the economy-recent trade
agreements have not provided for direct effect.29 As discussed below,
Heifer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,
107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
26. See Schneider, supra note 24, at 595-96; see also T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDA-
TIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 183-218 ('1988); Ronald A Brand, Direct Effects of
International Economic Law in the United States and the European Union, 17 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 556 (1996-97); Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect": An Infant Dis-
ease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155 (1983).
27. See, e.g., Matt Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for In-
ternational Trade Agreements to Perform Constitutional Functions with Respect to Sub-
Federal Governments?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 609 (1996-97).
28. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 44 S.Ct. 515 (1924) (Japanese national
sued the City of Seattle for the ability to open a pawn shop). The Court, quoting language
from the treaty: "[tihe citizens... of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the
liberty to... reside in the territories of the other to carry on trade...[,]" held in favor of the
Japanese national. For more on self-executing treaties, see Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing
Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of
Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995); and Charles D. Siegal, Individual
Rights Under Self-Executing Extradition Treaties-Dr. Alvarez-Machain's Case, 13 LoY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 765 (1991).
29. In fact, these treaties have explicitly stated that there is no direct effect. See Uru-
guay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). "No provision of
any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any
person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have
effect." Id. at § 102(a)(1). See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 79-105 (2nd ed. 1997) (discussing
broadly U.S. law and the application of international trade treaties); John H. Jackson, U.S.
Constitutional Law Principles and Foreign Trade Law and Policy, in NATIONAL CONSTITU-
TIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 65 (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
eds., 1993) (reviewing the history of the application of trade treaties in U.S. law). See also
Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of International Agreements by Domestic Courts and the
[Vol. 20:697
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the Negotiation Regime and International Adjudication Regime have no
direct effect. The Investor Arbitration Regime provides direct effect for
only a narrow range of trade rights typically under bilateral investment
treaties ("BIT's"). Only in the Supranational Court Regime do private
actors have direct effect of a broad array of trade rights.
What we have witnessed in the last fifty years is an increased num-
ber of trade agreements with increased importance to domestic
economies. These trade treaties have been designed to influence private
actors-to invest, to import, and to export-and to encourage this be-
havior by promising governmental restraint from inequitable treatment.
Nonetheless, although private actors make decisions based on the rights
provided in these treaties, trade treaties have moved away from provid-
ing direct effect of rights.3°
2. Standing before the Dispute Resolution Body
Closely linked to direct effect of rights are the fora available for
private actors to protect these rights. Dispute resolution regimes differ
in the identity of the parties entitled to bring cases and complaints to
any dispute resolution body. Traditionally, under international law, only
recognized states participated in dispute resolution, either through ne-
gotiations or in international courts.3' Both the Negotiation Regime and
the International Adjudication Regime reflect this traditional approach
to standing. In the last fifty years, however, regimes have evolved that
also provide standing to other entities. For example, in the Investor Ar-
bitration Regime, private actors have standing to bring limited actions
against states. In the Supranational Court Regime, private actors also
have standing. In addition, an oversight body has standing to bring a
case in the Supranational Court Regime.
Much has been written about the importance of standing because it
affects the ability of parties to enforce a trade agreement. The advan-
tages of private actor standing seem to fall into two major categories.
First, when a private actor or an oversight body has the ability to
Politics of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559 (1996).
30. I am grateful to Steve Charnovitz for an interesting discussion on the anomaly of in-
creasing importance of trade treaties and decreasing rights from these treaties, particularly
when compared with human rights treaties that have moved more consistently to provide
increased rights and direct effect of these rights. See Schneider, supra note 24, at 598-600.
See also Thomas Cottier and Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, The Relationship Between
World Trade Organization Law, National and Regional Law, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 83 (1998)
(outlining the advantages and disadvantages of direct effect of WTO law).
31. See Schneider, supra note 24, at 627.
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enforce a trade agreement, more cases will be brought." While states
(and oversight bodies) face political obstacles to bringing cases against
other states, private actors do not share this concern. Therefore, more
suits are apt to be brought. Further, private actors are better able to po-
lice the agreement because they are directly affected by any violation
and make an economic assessment based on that injury.
The second advantage of private actor standing is that citizens po-
lice their own government's compliance with the agreement.33 If that
task were left to states alone, no state would bring a case against itself.
The best evidence of the significance of standing in terms of an interna-
tional organization's development is the number of important EU cases
brought by a private actor.
3. Supremacy over Domestic Law
The third legal factor differentiating between dispute resolution re-
gimes is whether the dispute resolution regimes create binding law for
their member states. Under international law, any international agree-
ment appropriately created is supreme to domestic law. (Of course, the
supremacy of international law in the domestic arena is left to each state
to determine.) However, states vary widely in terms of how and when
32. "By refusing to permit private parties to appear before the Court, the founders of the
International Court foreclosed, as it turns out, the most fertile source of international litiga-
tion." JANIS, supra note 18, at 122; see also Schneider, supra note 24, at 629-30 & nn. 126-
30.
33. See Robert Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 51-93
(Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992) (arguing that jurisdictional redundancy, as exists between
the federal and state system in the U.S. and also between the domestic systems and the EU,
can effectively deal with the problems of the elite in a political system and is an appropriate
method of dealing with conflicting values in a society). But see Kenneth W. Dam, Extrater-
ritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1993 SuP. CT. REV. 289,
320-22 (1994) (arguing that, in the application of extraterritorial securities laws, the exis-
tence of private plaintiffs improperly moves the locus of foreign policy decision-making
from the executive branch to the judicial branch).
34. See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen 1963 E.C.R. I [hereinafter Van Gend en
Loos] (establishing direct effect of the Treaty of Rome); Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale
per L'Energia Elettrica 1964 E.C.R. 585 [hereinafter Costa v. ENEL] (establishing suprem-
acy of the Treaty of Rome); Case 41/75, Van Duyn v. Home Office 1974 E.C.R. 1337
[hereinafter Van Duyn] (establishing direct effect of directives); Case 43/75, Defrenne v.
Societe Anonyme Beige De Navigation Aerienna Sabena 1976 E.C.R. 455 [hereinafter De-
frenne] (recognizing horizontal direct effect [direct effect vis-A-vis private actors] from the
Treaty of Rome); Case 106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Commercial International De Ali-
mentacion SA 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135 [hereinafter Marleasing] (finding no horizontal direct
effect in the case of directives); Cases 6/90 and 9/90, Francovich and Others v. Italian Re-
public 1991 E.C.R. 5357 [hereinafter Francovich] (awarding damages stemming from non-
implementation of a directive).
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international law is incorporated into domestic law. " Furthermore,
while many states are clear on the role of international treaties in their
domestic legal system36 few states have clearly set forth how interna-
tional decisions arising from dispute resolution regimes should be
treated. Therefore, we must look to each dispute resolution regime to
see how decisions affect the member states and whether those decisions
are considered supreme to domestic law.
The importance of supremacy in international organizations cannot
be doubted. In the end, it is up to each state to comply with and enforce
international law. If a domestic dispute resolution empowers the do-
mestic judiciary to enforce an international decision, it is wholly
different in scope and effectiveness than a dispute resolution regime in
which doubt exists whether there is supremacy over domestic law.37
4. Transparency
The transparency of a dispute resolution regimes directly affects
how it is used and perceived by the member states involved in each of
the dispute resolution regimes. In examining the transparency of a dis-
pute resolution regimes, we should examine both the rules of the dispute
resolution regimes as well as the decisions resulting from the dispute
resolution regimes. The procedures for the dispute resolution regimes
set forth below vary from ad hoc and informal to published, clear and
strict procedures. Similarly, results of using the dispute resolution re-
gimes vary from confidential negotiated agreements or arbitration
awards to regularly published tribunal decisions.
The level of transparency of the dispute resolution regimes is im-
portant in three ways that I have set forth previously:3" publicity,
precedent, and predictability. Publicity describes the level of public
knowledge about the dispute resolution regimes. For example, when
35. Schneider, supra note 24, at 609-13. See also Symposium, The Interaction Between
National Courts and International Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (1995-96).
36. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... )
This interpretation of treaties is similar to the one in the United Kingdom and other Com-
monwealth states in which courts have found international treaties to be equal to national
law. In these latter states, however, separate implementing legislation beyond ratification is
needed to provide direct effect under these treaties. This has also been the case in the United
States in more recent treaty implementation where treaties are not given direct effect unless
expressly provided for in separate implementation legislation.
37. See for example Gabriel Albarracfn et al., The Relationship Between the Laws De-
rived From the Organs of MERCOSUR and the Legal Systems of the Countries That
Comprise MERCOSUR, 4 J. INT'L & COMP. L., 897 (1998) for a discussion on the confusion
within the MERCOSUR as to how MERCOSUR laws should be applied.
38. See Schneider, supra note 24, at 613-14.
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results are published, the process is clear, and decisions are explained,
member states are more likely to comply with those rulings.39 Precedent
refers to the ability of dispute resolution regimes to provide persuasive
or binding authority. While the doctrine of stare decisis is not used in
international tribunals, these tribunals clearly cite previous decisions as
persuasive.0 Likewise, predictability of a dispute resolution regime is
very important to its users because it creates confidence in the system.4'
Transparent rules and clear decisions are more likely to encourage states
or private actors to become involved in a dispute resolution regime.
Overall, transparency increases the legitimacy of the regime.42
5. Enforcement & Punishment
The final factor differentiating between dispute resolution regimes
is the type of enforcement each regime provides. Unfortunately, the lack
of compliance with international law and global enforcement mecha-
39. See generally, ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVER-
EIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 22 (1995).
40. See for example, the WTO Shrimp-Turtle case, which makes reference to earlier
GATT and WTO decisions. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). For a critique of the current analysis on prece-
dent, see Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of
a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845 (1999).
41. The argument has also been made that permanent tribunals versus ad hoc panels add
to predictability of a regime. See, e.g., Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst, supra note 6, at
890-899. Lack of regular use can also hurt predictability. See, e.g., Heifer & Slaughter, su-
pra note 25 at 301-03. For example, the lack of case law precedent as well as the review
process make the arbitral facility under the International Centre for the Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID) less appealing to investors. Difficulty with interference by
national courts has made ICSID even more unreliable. See Maritimes Int'l Nominees Estab-
lishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (ICSID, Case No.
ARB/84/4) (refusing to enforce the ICSID arbitral award); Monroe Leigh, Judicial Deci-
sions, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 206, 222-25 (1987) (detailing AMCO Asia Corp. v. Republic of
Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 25 I.L.M. 1439 (1986), where the Indonesian gov-
ernment annulled the ICSID decision on the grounds that ICSID "manifestly exceeded its
powers.")
42. See Pub. Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., 804 F. Supp. 385 (D.D.C. 1992);
see, e.g., Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade
Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 631 (1994) (arguing that the secrecy and lack of public input
in U.S. trade policy results in a policy that is biased toward trade liberalization at the ex-
pense of other values); Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-
making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699 (1994) (discussing the undemocratic nature of interna-
tional trade decision-making); Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International
Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681 (1996-97). There
has even been litigation over this subject. In response to complaints about lack of transpar-
ency, a U.S. District Court ordered the United States Trade Representative to grant public
access to submissions to GATT dispute resolution panels. See 804 F. Supp. 385 supra. The
U.S. government is currently trying to increase transparency in the WTO. See, e.g., Peter




nisms is a typical and somewhat tired critique of the field.43 If one stops
there, it would cripple further analysis of why international law is actu-
ally followed most of the time. That is why a focus on improving
compliance with international law is necessary as we continue to create
new institutions and new rules that provide us with the opportunity to
increase enforcement and compliance."4 Furthermore, particularly in the
area of trade, it has been long argued that having a system of enforce-
ment is important to promote trade.45
The existing dispute resolution regimes discussed below provide
opportunities for enforcement at three different levels. The first level is
when the trade agreement includes no formal adjudicatory procedure to
remedy non-compliance. Any dispute about compliance would require
additional negotiations or a new trade agreement. The second level is
when the trade agreement has created some body to hear disputes over
non-compliance. Depending on standing, states or private actors may
have the ability to bring cases under the trade agreement in order to en-
force the agreement. A third level of enforcement is when states or
private actors can bring a case for non-compliance with a decision of the
dispute resolution body. My prior analogy to traffic laws provides a
helpful example here.46 Creating a speed limit with no police enforce-
ment is the first level of enforcement. The second level is where a police
officer is able to write a traffic ticket in order to enforce the speed limit.
The third level of enforcement is when an arrest warrant is issued in
order to enforce payment of the ticket. Each of the dispute resolution
regimes discussed in the article operate at different levels of enforce-
ment.
Dispute resolution regimes also differ in the type of punishment
provided to enforce the trade agreement. As dispute resolution regimes
have evolved to provide for better enforcement, the punishment options
have also improved. Under the Vienna Convention on Treaties, breach
of a treaty meant that the non-breaching party may suspend the treaty.47
43. See, e.g., Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory, supra note 1, at 336-8;
G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and Internationa I Relations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 855-56 (1995).
44. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 39.
45. Private actors will be more likely to trade if they know the rules will be enforced.
See, e.g. Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role Of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law
Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 EcoN. & POL. 1 (1990). Institutions
are able to deal with the problem of defection and improve the likelihood of governmental
compliance as well. See George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation,
19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 319 (1998).
46. See Schneider, supra note 24, at 620.
47. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
art. 60, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. As a last resort, a
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Dispute resolution regimes today provide for retaliation under the
treaty, fines, and damages to harmed parties. This latter punishment is
particularly noteworthy in that it mimics a domestic court's ability to
remedy harm and is also narrowly tailored to punish each particular
violation. The threat of real economic punishment judicially imposed is
a relatively new one for international trade organizations. And although
treaty-sanctified retaliation remains a blunt instrument of policy, it is
definitely an improvement.48 The shift in the relative seriousness of
these remedies is already evident.49
The factors discussed in the previous section outline the variable
ranges that dispute resolution systems can take. The following table sets
forth the factors above as applied to the four regimes discussed more
fully below.
Regimes/ Negotiation Investment International Supranational
Factors Arbitration Adjudication Court
Direct Effect No Yes No Yes
Standing for No Yes No Yes, directly and
Private Actors indirectly
Supremacy None Only as to that Supreme, but not Supreme and
award integrated into Integrated
domestic law
Transparency Optional Optional Yes Yes




party to a treaty may terminate its obligation by breach but must confront the consequences
addressed by Article 60.
48. See Kishore Gawande & Wendy L. Hansen, Retaliation, Bargaining, and the Pur-
suit of "Free and Fair" Trade, 53 INT'L ORG. 117 (1999). Based on empirical work, the
authors argue that retaliation and the threat of retaliation can be very effective. They also
argue that the WTO will make threats even more powerful.
49. The U.S.-E.U. disputes over beef hormones and bananas demonstrate the gravity
and impact of the new punishments provided under the WTO. See, e.g., U.S. Threatens
Europe With Duties in Beef Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1999, at C2; Elizabeth Olson,
Latest Banana Squabble: Retroactivity of Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at C5;
David E. Sanger, Ruling Allows Tariffs by U.S. Over Bananas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1999, at





1. Individual Rights & Standing"
The first type of regime of an international dispute resolution sys-
tem is the Negotiation Regime. The Negotiation Regime is exemplified
by the dispute settlement system of the General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs ("GATT")5 as it existed prior to the creation of the WTO as
well as the current form of Chapter 20 of the NAFTA.52 In this regime,
most of the factors we have discussed are on the lower end of the range.
Typically, individuals are not granted rights under the organizations that
use negotiation as their regime nor are individuals involved in the nego-
tiation process. Disputes under this system are resolved informally
using diplomacy between states. For example, in a disagreement over
alleged dumping, two states might make an. ad hoc agreement to change
the particular system discussed.53 Historically, most disputes regarding
trade, or anything else, have been resolved in this way.
2. Supremacy
Disputes under this regime are resolved by a negotiated agreement
between states. This dispute resolution may result in changes to some
law or practice in one or both states. More often, however, this type of
dispute resolution agreement will not result in an amendment to an ex-
isting treaty or a new treaty itself, but rather will be a lesser type of
commitment from the governments. Therefore, this dispute resolution
will not be granted supremacy over domestic laws unless it, too, is con-
sidered international law under the respective domestic systems.54
3. Transparency
In terms of transparency, a negotiated agreement may be publicized,
particularly when governments are trying to please a domestic constitu-
55ency. It may also provide an example for other negotiations over
50. For the purposes of this article, I use individuals and private actors interchangeably.
51. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
52. NAFTA, supra note 2, Chapter 20.
53. See, e.g., Japan to Extend Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles at Current
2.3 Million Units, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. 115 (1990).
54. Unless this agreement resulted in a new treaty or executive agreement, this agree-
ment would not be considered supreme to U.S. law. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981).
55. For example, U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield announced the voluntary
export restraint on Japanese cars in advance of the agreement. See Mike Tharp, Car Pledge
by Japanese is Predicted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1981, at D5. See also Clyde H. Farnsworth
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similar disputes, although this type of dispute resolution is clearly not
precedent for any court.56 Nor do negotiated agreements create predict-
ability for individuals or other states. Unlike a court case, where
previous cases can be analyzed and decisions examined, an upcoming
negotiation cannot be easily predicted based on previously negotiated
agreements.
4. Enforcement
Enforcement under a negotiation regime of dispute resolution is left
to the respective states. There is no oversight institution. Any noncom-
pliance with the underlying trade agreement would put the parties back
at the negotiation table in order to work out the dispute. In other words,
a negotiation regime relies on "first-order" compliance at all times.57
States either follow the agreement or renegotiate a new agreement.58
C. Investor Arbitration Regime
The Investor Arbitration Regime was specifically created to give
private actors both rights and remedies under the relevant international
treaty. The move toward investment arbitration began with the creation
of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID") under the aegis of the World Bank. A decade later, the UN
Commission for International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") drafted rules
& Daniel F. Cuff, "Voluntary" Import Restraint, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1984, at DI. Publica-
tion of a draft agreement can also help move the negotiation process along. For example, the
Dunkel Draft in the negotiating of the WTO and the White Paper prior to the Single Euro-
pean Act were both publicized. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW 233-39 (1993) [hereinafter ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW] (discussing the
Dunkel Draft of the WTO); Bermann, supra note 4, at 530-35 (discussing the political back-
ground and negotiating history up to the SEA). There is also the issue of strategic leaks
where the information is leaked although not officially made public.
56. But see, Paul Lewis, Europeans Welcome Auto Pact, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1981, at
Dl (noting that the Europeans would be requesting a voluntary export restraint similar to the
one agreed to between Japan and the United States).
57. Schneider, supra note 24, at 617. First order compliance means that there is no en-
forcement power beyond the establishment of the rule itself.
58. For example, Japan and the U.S. have had to renegotiate their agreement on the auto
parts market several times. See, e.g., High Level Talks Slated With Japan on Auto Agree-
ment, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 1714 (1997); U.S. Frustrated by Japan's Progress on Car Sales,
Dealerships in Auto Talks, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 1759 (1997); David Sanger, Bottom Line:
Business Over Politics, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1995, at D5.
59. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, art. 5, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S.
159, 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. See also Thomas L. Brewer, In-
ternational Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures: The Regime for Foreign Direct
Investment, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 633, 655-56 (1995).
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for adhoc arbitration. 60 This concept of permitting individuals to bring
cases against states has since been copied in bilateral investment trea-
ties61 in order to encourage foreign direct investment62 and outlined in
NAFTA for investor disputes under Chapter 1 lB.63
1. Individual Rights
Under the treaties that establish investment arbitration, private ac-
tors are granted such rights as national treatment" or a minimum standard
of treatment65 in the host state. These rights are directly effective. In other
60. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N. Doc. A/31/17, para. 57, 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976).
See also ISAAK I. DORE, THE UNCITRAL FRAMEWORK FOR ARBITRATION IN CONTEMPO-
RARY PERSPECTIVE (1993).
61. See, e.g., Argentina-United States: Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encourage-
ment and Protection of Investment, Nov. 14, 1991, art. IV, 31 I.L.M. 124, 131 (1992)
[hereinafter Argentina-U.S. BIT].
62. See Kenneth Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development:
The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 501 (1998). The
author notes that more than 160 countries have concluded at least one BIT and more than
1300 BIT's have been signed. Id. at 503. More than two-thirds of these have been signed
since 1990. Id. at 503 n.8. See also Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt
Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L. L. 563
(1998).
63. NAFrA, supra note 2, Chapter I IB, at 642-646. A regime similar to investor arbi-
tration is also established in the Environmental Side Accord to NAFTA. North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, art. 14(l) supra note 2. See Rex J. Zedalis,
Claims by Individuals in International Economic Law: NAFTA Developments, 7 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 115 (1996); Kal Raustiala, International "Enforcement of Enforcement" Under
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 721
(1996); David Lopez, Dispute Resolution under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience,
32 TEX. INT'L L. J. 163, 184-192 (1997). A quasi-arbitral system is established under
Chapter 19 of NAFTA for antidumping and countervailing duties cases. I do not discuss that
process in this article because the panels under Chapter 19 apply national law rather than
international law. For more information, see David A. Gantz, Resolution of Trade Disputes
Under NAFTA's Chapter 19: The Lessons of Extending the Binational Panel Process to
Mexico, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 297 (1998).
64. Individuals granted rights under national treatment will receive the same treatment
as the state's nationals. This is also referred to as the Equality of Treatment Doctrine. See,
e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. IV (1), 4
U.S.T. 2063, 2067.
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment and
most-favored-nation treatment with respect to access to the courts of justice and to
administrative tribunals and agencies within the territories of the other Party, in all
degrees of jurisdiction, both in pursuit and in defense of their rights.
Id.
65. According to the Minimum Standard of International Justice, a state must grant an
alien at least a minimum standard of treatment, even if this means an alien would receive
better treatment than the state's own nationals. Interestingly, more recent U.S. treaties com-
bine both the national treatment and minimum standard. See, e.g., Argentina-U.S. BIT, supra
note 61.
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cases, domestic implementing legislation will provide for the rights to
become directly effective.66 This makes sense because these types of
treaties are specifically designed to encourage individual investment.
While an Investment Arbitration regime provides rights against the
host government, none of these underlying treaties provide direct effect
of rights against another individual. In other words, a private actor has
no recourse against another private actor under this regime. Investment
arbitration is established solely as a right and remedy between a private
investor and the host state.67 Further, because investment arbitration is
only available against a host state, nationals have no recourse against
their own government. Finally, rights under this regime have limited
scope. Investment Arbitration is provided for only the narrow right of
national treatment in most regimes. Any state action falling outside
those parameters is unreachable.66
2. Individual Standing
In investment arbitration, private actors have the ability to bring
cases directly against a state. This is quite an historic development in
this century. First, individuals were historically seen as nationals of
their state and, on the international plane, could only be represented by
their government. Second, private suits against a government in domes-
tic courts were also foreclosed due to laws that limited the grounds upon
which states could be sued. This meant that foreign investors had little
recourse to the host domestic legal system.69 Third, even if a private ac-
Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith,
on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investment or
associated activities of its own nationals or companies .... Investment shall at all
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and se-
curity and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by
international law.
Id., at art. II, at 129-30.
66. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-182, §§ 101-109, 107 Stat. 2057, 2061-68 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 3311 (1998)).
67. See Vandevelde, supra note 62, at 510.
68. Compare this to the rights of action under the EU. See infra note 98 and accompa-
nying discussion.
69. In fact, in most states the government has full sovereign immunity both in law and
in practice. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Government and Officers: Sovereign Immunity,
77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963). See also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204-223 (1882)




tor wanted to bring a suit in his own home court against the foreign
state, most states had laws that provided foreign sovereign immunity. 
70
In the meantime, international commercial arbitration had become a
popular method for resolving commercial disputes between private dis-
putants because it provided a more neutral, fairer, and potentially faster
way of resolving disputes." This regime appealed to investors who were
concerned with the potential bias, inefficiency, or unfamiliarity of for-
eign courts. By creating an international arbitration option between
individuals and states, creators of this regime hoped that investors
would be more willing to bring their business to these states because
disputes could be resolved through this international neutral body.
ICSID has jurisdiction over any legal dispute arising out of an in-
vestment between a Contracting State and a national of any other
Contracting State.72 For a national of a Contracting State or a Contract-
ing State to initiate proceeding under the ICSID, that party must submit
a written request to the Secretary-General of ICSID detailing the issues
in dispute, the parties, and consent to arbitration. After the dispute is
certified by the Secretary-General of ICSID, an individual can have the
case heard by an arbitral panel established by ICSID.73
3. Supremacy & Transparency
Arbitration decisions generally provide for damages and not a
change in domestic laws.74 Therefore, the issue of supremacy does not
70. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994)
("Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the
time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States..."); State Immunity Act, 1978, ch.33, part I (U.K.) (granting
foreign sovereign immunity in the United Kingdom).
71. The International Chambers of Commerce (ICC), created in 1923, has been fre-
quently used as a means for arbitration. In 1998, parties from over one hundred states filed a
record 466 new requests for arbitration. See ICC World Business Organization (last visited
Sep. 9, 1999) <http://www.iccwbo.org/court/front-topics/stat.asp>. For a very user-friendly
guide to commercial arbitration, see MARTIN HUNTER ET AL., THE FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO
ARBITRATION AND ADR (1993).
72. ICSID Convention, supra note 59, art. 25. The parties must, however, consent to the
use of the arbitration facility. See id. The use of ICSID has not been initiated by a Contract-
ing State in complaint of an individual of another Contracting State even though the potential
exists under the Convention provisions. See generally David A. Soley, ICSID Implementa-
tion: An Effective Alternative to International Conflict, 19 INT'L L. 521 (1985) (discussing
the ICSID framework for dispute resolution).
73. ICSID Convention, supra note 59, art. 36. Unless the Secretary-General finds that
the dispute falls outside the jurisdiction of the Centre, he will register the request and notify
the parties. See id. at art. 36(3).
74. Neither the ICSID or UNCITRAL rules explicitly deny the panel the ability to pro-
scribe a change in the law. However, arbitral panels have thus far only issued monetary
awards. See American Manufacturing & Trading Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID ABR/93/I
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really arise because there is no new law created. An arbitration decision
can also be kept confidential if requested by the parties.75 This means
that the decision cannot provide precedent or predictability in the sys-
tem because outside lawyers cannot analyze the panel's thinking.
4. Enforcement
In terms of enforcement, an investment arbitration system does pro-
vide for relatively effective enforcement. The Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards ("New York Conven-
tion") provides that all signatory states shall enforce arbitral awards in
their domestic courts.76 As a result, if a state refuses to pay the arbitral
award, the investor can go to the domestic court in that state or in any
state where there are commercial assets 77 in order to enforce the judg-
ment. Although the investor still must go to the domestic court, the New
York Convention provides for straightforward enforcement.78 In fact,
many states that once ignored court orders from other states now will-
(1997) and The Southern Pacific Properties Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID
ABR/84/3 (1992) for examples of monetary awards.
75. The ICSID Convention explicitly prohibits the publishing of awards without the
consent of the parties. ICSID Convention, supra note 59, art. 48(5). Thus, the transparency
of such a system remains questionable. See John B. Attanasio, Rapporteur's Overview and
Conclusions: Of Sovereignty, Globalization, and Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1
(1995-96) (addressing the factors that make the ICSID less credible than ICJ judgments).
But see, J.A. Freedberg, The Role of the International Councilfor Commercial Arbitration in
Providing Source Material in International Commercial Arbitration, 23 INT'L J. LEGAL
INFO. 272, 279 (1995) (stating that even though the Convention requires consent to publish,
many awards do get published).
76. Article III of the New York Convention states that "[e]ach Contracting State shall
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of proce-
dure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the
following articles." Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, art. 3, 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].
77. Any non-commercial asset would not be available for attachment pursuant to for-
eign sovereign immunities legislation. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
28 U.S.C. § 1604-06 (1994).
78. A party seeking enforcement must merely present an authenticated original award or
certified copy of an award to the domestic court in which state recognition is sought with the
original agreement to which the dispute has arisen. If requested, the documents must be
translated in the official language in which the domestic court is situated by the party seek-
ing enforcement. The domestic court can only refuse recognition for seven reasons: (1)
incapacity of the parties or invalidity of the agreement to which the parties have subjected
themselves, (2) lack of proper notice given to the defending party, (3) the award is outside
the jurisdiction of the arbitration, (4) the arbitral authority was outside its jurisdiction, (5) the
award is not binding on the parties, (6) the matter is unlawfully arbitrated under the domestic
court's laws, or (7) the enforcement of the award would be against public policy. See Ra-
mona Martinez, Recognition and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards Under the
United Nations Convention of 1958: The "Refusal" Provisions, 24 INT'L LAW. 487 (1990).
[Vol. 20:697
Getting Along
ingly comply with arbitral awards.79 This method of enforcement, how-
ever, is limited to those states that have signed the New York
Convention. While most developed states have signed it, there are a sig-
nificant number of developing states that have not. °
D. International Adjudication Regime
The regime of international adjudication is the one that we are most
familiar with under international law as the structure for resolving dis-
putes between states. Evolving from the Permanent Court of
Arbitration,8' and the Permanent Court of International Justice,82 the In-
ternational Court of Justice ("ICJ") is the most recognized international
court. In the trade arena, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding is
closest to international adjudication."
1. Individual Rights & Standing
Under the International Adjudication Regime, private actors are
neither granted rights directly by the treaty establishing the international
79. Judgment of Oct. 21, 1987, Corte Superior de Justicia, translated in XVI YEARBOOK
COM. ARB. 594 (1991); Judgment of Feb. 24, 1997, Tribunal Superior de Justicia, translated
in IV YEARBOOK COM. ARB. 301 (1979); and Judgment of Aug. 1, 1977, Tribunal Superior
de Justicia, translated in IV YEARBOOK COM. ARB. 302 (1979). See also Carl A. Valenstein
et al., Investor Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA, 2 LATIN AMERICA LAW AND BUSINESS
REPORT 15, 16 (March 1994); Carl A. Valenstein & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, NAFTA's
Arbitration Provisions Facilitate Resolution of Investor-Government Disputes, US-MEX.
FREE TRADE REP. (Feb. 18, 1994); Lisa C. Thompson, International Dispute Resolution in
the United States and Mexico: A Practical Guide to Terms, Arbitration Clauses, and the
Enforcement of Judgment and Arbitral Awards, 24 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. AND COM. 1, 17-28
(1997).
80. Approximately 110 states have signed the New York Convention. Significant ab-
sentees include Brazil, Nicaragua, Honduras, Pakistan and many of the Central Asian former
Soviet states. The membership of ICSID is larger with current membership at 131. Member-
ship, NEWS FROM ICSID (ICSID, Washington, D.C.), Sum. 1998, at 1.
81. On July 29, 1899, the Permanent Court of Arbitration was established at the first
Hague Peace Conference. The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Dis-
putes detailed the PCA, which was to become the first dispute settlement mechanism
between sovereign states. See generally Bette E. Shifman, The Revitalization of the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration, 23 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 284 (1995).
82. The Permanent Court of International Justice was established in 1921 by the League
of Nations. The Court, as the first world's court, heard thirty-one cases and issued twenty-
seven advisory opinions to international organizations. At the end of World War II, the es-
tablishment of the United Nations sparked the need for a new world court in consideration of
concerns by the parties who were not signatories to the League of Nations. The International
Court of Justice was formed in 1945. JANIS, supra note 18, at 118-21.
83. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multinational Trade Ne-
gotiations, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, app. 1, in The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1244 [hereinafter WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding].
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court nor have any right of standing to bring cases before the court.84
This regime exists to resolve disputes between states-inter-national
disputes-and therefore individuals have not had recourse to this re-
gime. 5 In some states, private actors may have the ability to petition
their government to take action on their behalf.86 In the United States,
the US Trade Representative makes the final decision whether or not to
bring the case and there is no judicial review of this action.1
7
84. Historically, individuals could request their government espouse their claims before
the ICJ or other international court. See Lotus Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 9 (1927). See also
David M. Reilly and Sarita Ordonez, Effect of the Jurisprudence of the International Court
of Justice on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 435 (1995-96) (analyzing U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan and the denial of individuals to bring a case in front
of the ICJ).
85. There is already a debate as to whether private parties should be given standing in
the WTO. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade
Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, I J. INT'L ECON. L. 123 (1998). But
see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate Over NGO Participation at the WTO, I J.
INT'L EcON. L. 433 (1998) (arguing that private actors are already involved significantly).
86. Section 301 allows an individual to petition the United States government to initiate
trade dispute resolutions. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994). Under section 302 a party can petition
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate a foreign government's poli-
cies or practices that are suspected to be hindering trade. See id. at § 2412. The USTR, under
section 304, must investigate and determine if the foreign government has violated a trade
agreement, benefits of any trade agreement are unreasonably being denied to the individual,
or the foreign government is unjustifiably burdening or restricting U.S. commerce. Id. at
§ 2414. If the dispute involves a trade agreement, the USTR is obligated under section
303(a)(2) to first use the dispute settlement procedures provided under that agreement. Id.
§ 2413. For example, if a dispute involves infringements based on one of the Uruguay
Round Agreements, the USTR must utilize the dispute resolution system of the WTO. If the
USTR finds that a trade infringement is occurring and is convinced that the dispute should
involve action by the United States it will pursue resolution of the dispute. See A. Lynne
Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement under Section 301: At
Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1996) (detailing conflicts between Section
301 and WTO policy); Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution Over Unilateral Retalia-
tion: Adjudicating the Use of Section 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcoN. L. 233
(1996). The EU also has a procedure whereby private actors can request the EU take action
against those governments violating free trade agreements. See Council Regulation 3286/94,
1994 O.J. (L 349) 71 [the Trade Barriers Regulation] (laying down EU procedures in the
field of common commercial policy); Petros C. Mavroidis and Werner Zdouc, Legal Means
to Protect Private Parties' Interests in the WTO: The Case of the EC New Trade Barriers
Regulation, I J. INT'L EcON. L. 407 (1998).
87. The USTR has discretion in determining whether to initiate investigations from the
petitions filed by interested individuals. See 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (1994). If the USTR
decides not to investigate, notice of such a determination with an explanation of reasons
must be published in the Federal Register. See id. § 2412(a)(3); Erwin Eichman & Gary N.
Horlick, Political Questions in International Trade: Judicial Review of Section 301?, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 735 (1989) (arguing that a denial by the USTR to pursue investigations of
an individual's petition should be reviewed by the judiciary).
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2. Supremacy & Transparency
Under international law, the decisions of the international court are
supreme to the domestic law and the relevant state must change its be-
havior or laws to comply.8 But the court's decision is not integrated into
domestic law.
The decision is published and, thus, can provide persuasive prece-
dent for similar disputes. 9 The procedure of an international court is
usually transparent and well understood by international lawyers in the
field as well as by national governments. The transparency of the sys-
tem provides the opportunity for both practitioners and academics to
analyze, improve, and comprehend this particular international dispute
resolution system.9°
3. Enforcement
Perhaps the most controversial part of international adjudication is
the question of compliance and enforcement. Because international
courts have not thus far had armies to forcibly carry out their decisions,
many critics of the international system focus on those cases where
states have chosen to ignore the international court. Similarly under
GATT, states could delay the appointments of panels, effectively block
adoption of panel reports and, on occasion, ignore panel decisions. For
instance, after the U.S. asserted a complaint in 1981 under GATT
against the European Community ("EC") concerning pasta export sub-
sidies, the EC effectively blocked adoption of the panel report in favor
of the United States. The United States resorted to indirect retaliation
efforts that sparked countermeasures by the EC.9 Without arguing as to
88. Of course, whether a state will follow that international decision is the subject of
domestic law. In a monist system of international law, the decision would automatically
become part of the domestic legal fabric. Under a dualist system, the international law must
be incorporated into the domestic law according to the procedures established under domes-
tic law. See JANIS, supra note 18, at 83-84.
89. See North Seas Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3; Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116. For a further discussion on precedent
in the ICJ, see MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT (1996).
90. For example, in the past five years, there have been well over 2000 law review arti-
cles written on the International Court of Justice. Likewise, there have been over 1500
articles published about the World Trade Organization since its creation in 1994.
91. See ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 55, at 151-54 (citing Sub-
sidies on Exports of Pasta Products, SCM/43, May 19, 1983, an unadopted decision, and
other cases detailing GATT's ineffectiveness); see also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dis-
pute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT
Dispute Settlement System Since 1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157, 1203-04 (1994)
(enumerating some further problem areas of the GATT dispute settlement system).
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whether an international court can ever truly "work," it is important to
assess the level of enforcement a court can have.
Both GATT and the ICJ are examples of court systems that provide
for no enforcement beyond censure of the international community.1
2
These systems stop at second-order compliance-states should obey the
law and, if held to be violating the law, should pay the fine (or change
their law). The WTO outlines more stringent enforcement measures by
providing a menu of enforcement options.93 First, a state has the oppor-
tunity to follow the ruling and, usually, change the offending practice.
Second, the state can continue the practice and pay damages to the
harmed state.9" If neither of these options are taken, the harmed state can
retaliate.9 The WTO provides that the harmed state must first retaliate
92. However, the enforcement of decisions in international law through voluntary com-
pliance should not be underestimated. States regularly abide by unfavorable rulings in order
to remain a law abiding member of the international community. Many penalties for non-
compliance exist outside the agreement. See Downs, supra note 45, at 321. Furthermore,
direct foreign aid, foreign investment, and World Bank projects are often linked to compli-
ance under international law. For example, the World Bank has played a major role in the
compliance of environmental laws in Mexico. See Mexico's Environmental Controls for New
Companies, 2 No. 9 MEX. TRADE & L. REP. 15 (1992); David Barrans, Note, Promoting
International Environmental Protections Through Foreign Debt Exchange Transactions, 24
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 65 (1991). But see Stephanie Guyett, Note, Environment and Lending:
Lessons of the World Bank, Hope for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 889 (1992) (for a criticism of the shortcomings of such
an enforcement mechanism).
93. See Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349 (1995) (discussing the effectiveness of the WTO with
a comparison of the lack of enforcement under compliance mechanisms of the IMF or the
World Bank). See also Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute Settlement Re-
port's: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Rule Compliance, 11 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 307 (1996).
94. Under Article 21 and 22 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, if the party
does not, within thirty days, state intentions for implementing recommendations of the
adopted panel report and set a time period for compliance, the parties must commence nego-
tiations for mutually accepted compensation. WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra
note 83, art. 21, at 1238-39. An economist might explain this provision as permitting
"efficient breaches" of the WTO. Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis
of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 33 (1999). Compensation is regarded as a tem-
porary stop gap measure until compliance in most cases. Only in cases of non-violation is
compensation a long-term solution. See C. O'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power:
Section 301 and The World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 287 [hereinafter The Limits of Economic Power] ("The DSU expressly
states that in response to a non-violation finding by a panel, there is no obligation incurred
by the offending party to withdraw the measure. Instead, the panel or Appellate Body can
only recommend that the offending Member State make a 'mutually satisfactory adjust-
ment.' "). See also Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,
WT/DS44/R at 27 (March 31, 1998).
95. Article 22 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding allows the complaining
party to request authorization from the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to retaliate. The DSB
must grant authorization within thirty days unless there is a consensus against such
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in the same sector of trade. However, if this is not effective, the WTO
provides that cross-sector retaliation is permitted. 96 This newer evolution
of the international adjudication regime has more teeth than its prede-
cessors and attempts to correct some of the problems of the past.97
E. Supranational Court Regime
1. Individual Rights & Standing
A Supranational Court Regime of international dispute resolution is
different from the International Adjudication Regime in a number of
ways. First, private actors are granted rights under the constituent
treaty and have the ability to bring their complaints to the suprana-
tional court. The clearest example of this type of individual
involvement occurs in the European Union. Under the Treaty of Rome
and pursuant to caselaw from the European Court of Justice, citizens of
member states of the EU are granted rights directly from the treaty and
retaliation. Of course retaliation is only as strong as the state that is retaliating. WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding, supra note 83, art. 22. In the 50 years of GATr, retaliation has
only been authorized once. The Netherlands retaliated against the United States for dairy
quotas in 1953. ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATF LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLO-
MACY 181-200 (1990) [hereinafter THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM] (covering the entire history
of the "dairy quotas" case).
96. Article 22 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding permits cross-sector re-
taliation if the previous retaliation, within the sector, is not deemed practical or effective.
The determination of whether retaliation is "practical" or "effective" will be made by the
complaining party, rather than the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. However, para-
graph 4 limits the retaliation a government can impose to the equivalent of benefits that the
defending state was impairing. WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 83, art.
21. See also 19 U.S.C. 241 l(a)(3) (imp6sing the same limitations).
97. See Mary E. Footer, The Role of Consensus in GA7T/WTO Decision-Making, 17
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 653 (1996-97); Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 555, 580 (1996); Paul Demaret, The
Metamorphoses of the GATT: From the Havana Charter to the World Trade Organization,
34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123 (1995).
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legislation passed thereunder.98 This direct effect under the EU is al-
ready quite revolutionary in comparison to most international treaties.99
The EU also provides private actors the opportunity to bring cases
before the ECJ-directly to the ECJ or indirectly through their domestic
courts. The impact of individual involvement in international dispute
resolution cannot be underestimated.' 0 Individuals play the important
function of private enforcement agents. '° ' As such, individuals can
themselves ensure that the law is being followed rather than relying on
states or an oversight body (such as the Commission in the case of the
EU) to bring a case. States may feel reluctant to bring cases against
other states for somewhat minor infractions. Furthermore, it may be in
many states interests not to follow the letter of the law exactly or delay
compliance with the numerous laws set out under the EU. If states per-
mit this behavior between themselves, it becomes collusion to ignore
the law at the expense of their citizens.' 2
While the oversight body is more likely to bring cases than a state,
it, too, has the problem of a vast number of potential cases while main-
taining its political agenda. The oversight body rarely has sufficient
resources to check compliance with all laws or to bring all cases of non-
compliance to the court. Individuals do not have the political baggage of
98. The ECJ has interpreted the language of Article 189 as conferring rights upon the
nationals of Member States in certain circumstances. The Court has distinguished vertical
direct effect, the rights of an individual to sue a governmental entity, from horizontal direct
effect, the right of an individual to sue another individual. The Court has acknowledged
vertical direct effect involving disputes arising from treaty articles, regulations, and direc-
tives. See Van Gend en Loos, supra note 34; Costa v. ENEL, supra note 34; Van Duyn v.
Home Office, supra note 34; Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hamp-
shire Area Health Authority, 1986 E.C.R. 723 [hereinafter Marshall]. However, the Court
has not been so lenient on the rights of individuals established by horizontal direct effect.
Although the Courts have recognized horizontal direct effect in disputes arising from treaty
articles and regulations, the Court refuses to acknowledge horizontal direct effect in disputes
arising from directives. See Defrenne supra note 34; Marleasing, supra note 34.
99. See Brand, supra note 26; David O'Keefe, Judicial Protection of the Individual by
the European Court of Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 901 (1996); Louis F. De Duca,
Teaching of the European Community Experience for Developing Regional Organizations,
11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 485 (1993). In fact, the EU does not provide direct effect for other in-
ternational treaties including the GATT. See Brand, supra note 26, at 572-79.
100. See Schneider, supra note 24.
101. See The Transformation of Europe, supra note 21, at 2421 (noting the importance
of citizens to the EU judicial system); P.P. Craig, Once upon a Time in the West: Direct
Effect and the Federalization of EEC Law, 12 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 453 (1992) (arguing
that private enforcement agents are critical to the success of the EU system of direct effect).
See generally Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in Inter-
national Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L. L. 611 (1994) (arguing that non-
governmental organizations should be able to act as amici curiae in international courts).
102. See generally Carlos A. Ball, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Society:
The Court of Justice, Social Policy, and Individual Rights Under the European Communities
Legal Order, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307 (1996).
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bringing a case against another state. Further, individuals can make a
direct economic assessment about whether it is worth it to them to spend
the time and money on litigation. For these reasons, where individuals
are granted rights and where the benefits of the treaty are supposed to
accrue directly to individuals, it makes sense to give individuals a rem-
edy for violation of those rights.o3
2. Supremacy
The name "supranational" in this regime comes from the fact that
the court and its rulings are clearly supreme in all ways to domestic law.
The rulings from the supranational court must be followed by domestic
courts, legislatures, and the executive branch. That is in contrast, for
example, to rulings under the International Adjudication Regime above,
which are usually only directed to the executive branch.
Supremacy of a supranational court is also promoted when the deci-
sions themselves are integrated into the domestic legal fabric as has
been done with the referral system under the ECJ.'04 Because the ECJ
makes the ruling on the law alone, the domestic court then renders the
final decision applying the EU law to the facts at hand. In this way, the
decision is one from a domestic court. As many commentators have
noted, states are far less likely to ignore the decisions of their own court
than they are of an international court.' °5 One final element of suprem-
acy is that domestic judges, under a supranational regime, are given the
power of judicial review. Judges at any level may strike down domestic
law as incompatible with EU law."
103. In fact, this avenue to the court provided some of the most important cases in the
judicial history of the ECJ. See, supra note 34. Furthermore, the ECJ hears more cases as
preliminary references under Article 177 than directly. In the early years of the EEC, from
1958-1973, nearly two-third of all cases in front of the ECJ came through preliminary rul-
ings. See the Commission's annual General Report on the Activities of the Communities
cited in Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Legal Systems of Regional Economic Integration, 22 AM. J.
COMP. L. 415, 426 (1974). This use of Article 177 references continues to increase. In 1993,
the ECJ received 203 references which more than doubled the number of cases in 1980. See
Sarah E. Strasser, Evolution & Effort: The Development of a Strategy of Docket Control for
the European Court of Justice & the Question of Preliminary References, JEAN MONNET
PAPERS (Harvard Law School, 1995). For a review of the most recent literature assessing the
impact of individual litigants and EU law, see Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Re-
visiting the European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 177 (1998). The push to give private
actors rights in the World Trade Organization is based on the strengths of the European Un-
ion. See, e.g. Schneider, supra note 24; Shell supra note 43, at 917-25.
104. See Attanasio, supra note 75, at 10-14; Lenore Jones, Opinions of the Court of the
European Union in National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 275 (1996).
105. See J.H.H. Weiler & Ulrich Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Or-
der-Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT'L L. J. 411 (1996) (commenting on the well-
established supremacy doctrine of the ECJ and its limitations).
106. See, e.g., Mattli & Slaughter, supra note 103, at 200-04.
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3. Transparency
Under this regime, the supranational court works hard at maintain-
ing its transparency to its users. The procedures and membership of the
court are well-known. The decisions are published rapidly (and in the
ECJ's situation, also include the Advocate-General's opinion) in order
to provide clear reasoning of the outcome. This helps ensure the pre-
dictability of the court and continually increases the comfort level of
private attorneys practicing before the court.
4. Enforcement
The supranational court has a strong enforcement mechanism. First,
cases can be brought for noncompliance with earlier court decisions-
yet another level of enforcement in this system.07 Second, the suprana-
tional court acts more like a domestic court in that it ensures damages
are directly awarded to aggrieved individuals." This power makes the
national government more likely to comply with an international law in
that it puts a price tag on noncompliance. Indeed, the costs of noncom-
pliance can be severe and direct.'09 And in some ways, it makes
107. For example, see Case 169/87, Commission v. France, 1988 E.C.R. 4093 (in
which the Commission was forced to bring France in front of the ECJ for the second time for
noncompliance with an earlier court ruling on tobacco pricing) and Case 69/86, Commission
v. Italy, 1987 E.C.R. 773 (enforcing a previous judgement against Italy for the quality con-
trol of produce).
108. See Case 14/83, Von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E.C.R. 1891
(allowing individual workers to enforce their rights under a Community Directive on equal
employment); Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v. Landwirtschafts-Kammer For Das
Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989 (forcing Germany officials to refund illegal money charged to
individuals for the inspection of imported apples even though the German statute of frauds
had run on the claim). See generally O'Keefe, supra note 99; April Philippa Tash, Note,
Remedies for European Community Law Claims in Member State Courts: Toward a Euro-
pean Standard, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 377 (1993).
109. See Francovich, supra note 34 (forcing Italy to compensate workers for damages
suffered by non-implementation of a Community Directive dealing with workers' protection
against bankrupt employers); Marshall, supra note 98 (imposing damages that exceeded the
United Kingdom's statutory limitations); Case 70/72 Commission v. Germany, 1973 E.C.R.
813 (forcing Germany to not only cease the illegal payments of state aid but also to recover
any aid already granted to its nationals). Remarkably, the ECJ has not imposed any fine thus
far in a case brought by the Commission. Article 171 specifically states that the ECJ may, by
the request of the Commission, impose a lump sum or penalty payments upon a Member
State that refuses compliance. This Article was added to the Treaty on European Union by
the request of Parliament concerned with the enforcement of Community law. See Treaty on
European Union, supra note 5, Article 171(1) (stating that necessary measures shall be taken
for enforcement of compliance, has been used by the ECJ); Lisa Borgfeld White, Comment,
The Enforcement of European Union Law: The Role of the European Court of Justice and
the Courts Latest Challenge, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 833, 857 n.207 (1996) (listing the fifteen
cases in violation of Article 171). However, the imposition of a fine, under Article 171(2),
has yet to be employed. See Kenneth M. Lord, Note, Bootstrapping an Environmental Policy
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compliance in the first place easier since a government can demonstrate
how noncompliance will directly hurt the national treasury. Moreover,
the enforcement power of the court helps the governments protect them-
selves against strong domestic lobbies.
These remedies are in addition to a requirement to change the law
(as opposed to the choice granted in the WTO). 10 Furthermore, by re-
placing the traditional international law remedy of retaliation, the
system is closer to a domestic court system. Violations of international
law are treated like any other violation of the law. By eliminating re-
taliation, the supranational court system avoids escalation between
states retaliating and cross-retaliating. It also avoids linkage between
different trade issues: each problem is treated separately and judged on
its own merits.
III. POLITICAL & ECONOMIC VARIABLES FOR DECIDING WHICH
REGIME IS APPROPRIATE
Now that we have outlined the four regimes of international dispute
resolution, the next step is to outline the variables that help us determine
the most appropriate regime for any given trade organization. These
variables differ from the factors outlined in the previous section in that
these variables are the political and economic factors behind the crea-
tion of international organizations. The first set of variables outlined the
legal structures (or lack thereof) in the international dispute resolution
system. This second set of variables applies a series of multidisciplinary
integration theories to the dispute resolution regimes.
Several of these variables derive from responses to the realist theory
of political science. Realism argued that states act only in their best in-
terests in a system of anarchy. Yet realist theory was not able to explain
why states would then form international organizations."' Regime the-
ory, created as a response to realist theory, argued that states are rational
from an Economic Convent: The Teleogical Approach of the European Court of Justice, 29
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 571, 604 n.325 (1996) (commenting on the lack of enforcement through
use of fines); see also Michael J. McGuinness, Recent Development, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L.
579, 594 n.81 (1994) (reasoning the lack of enforcement by use of Article 171).
110. See supra note 94 and accompanying discussion.
11. See Abbott, supra note 1 at 336-38; see also A Dual Agenda, supra note 1 at 214-
18 (discussing realism theory). For more on applying realism to international trade, see gen-
erally ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (1975) and HANS J. MORGENTHAU,
POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1973).
Summer 19991
Michigan Journal of International Law
actors and would cooperate when it was in their best interests.' 2 From
regime theory came a theory of "mesoinstitutions"-a theory by Ken-
neth Abbott and Duncan Snidal that attempts to explain the presence of
formal international organizations." 3 Moving away from both realist and
regime theory, liberal international relations theory explains state coop-
eration by examining the impact of private actors on state choices and
arguing that states will act based on the preferences of their popula-
tions. 114
From economics, we have several different theories that have been
identified as applying to international organizations and how they oper-
ate. The first is the theory of economic integration outlined by Bela
Balassa explaining organizations that are created in order to facilitate
economic cooperation."5 The second is Ronald Coase's theory of the
firm and a cost-benefit analysis as applied by Joel Trachtman to inter-
national organizations. ' 6 Finally, Joseph Weiler has applied Albert
Hirschman's political and economic theory of exit, voice and loyalty to
the EU to explain the EU's historical development."7 Each of these
112. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1983) (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); Frie-
drich Kratochwil & John G. Ruggie, International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art
of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753 (1986).
113. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Mesoinstitutions: The Role of Formal Or-
ganizations in International Politics, (1995) [hereinafter Mesoinstitutions] (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author). Abbott and Snidal have published a revised version of
this paper in the J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. See infra note 155. Where possible, I have
cited to the published article, however, the concept of Mesoinstitutions is only used in the
unpublished manuscript. Additionally, the original concepts of facilitating versus producing
organizations have been eliminated from the published article. The published article uses the
concepts of centralization and independence to outline the range of potential activities. See
also Essay in Trade Governance, supra note 8 (applying mesoinstitutional theory to the
FTAA).
114. See Andrew Moravscik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of Inter-
national Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513 (1997); see also Shell, supra note 43 (applying regime
theory and liberal theory to propose reforms for the WTO).
115. BELA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1961). Balassa's theory
has been widely applied by legal scholars in analyzing organizations. See, e.g., Paul A.
O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles Under a
NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 127 (1995) (discussing importance of NAFTA to
the establishment of the free trade zone in the Western Hemisphere); Essay in Trade Gov-
ernance, supra note 8; Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst, supra note 6.
116. The Theory of the Firm, supra note 19. Also, see Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note
94 for an exhortation to apply law and economics to international law and Ronald S. Cass,
Economics and International Law, 29 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. 473 (1997) for encourage-
ment of the application of economic theory of international law.
117. The Transformation of Europe, supra note 21, at 2411, citing A. HIRSCHMAN,




theories offer compelling explanations as to why states cooperate and
what forms this cooperation can take." 8
Albert Hirschman's political economic theory of exit, voice, and
loyalty when applied to international organizations turns on the issue of
sovereignty. "9 Therefore, this article examines the potential levels of
retained sovereignty under international organizations. The next part
turns to variables derived from the theory of mesoinsitutions-the po-
tential functions of the international organization. These functions have
been divided into facilitating international organizations and producing
international organizations. Facilitating international organizations have
decentralized cooperation through normative, consultative, supportive,
and initiative functions. Producing international organizations, on the
other hand, rely on centralized cooperation and a cession of some sover-
eignty in order to produce rules, assistance, and information.'2° Levels of
economic integration are examined next derived from Balassa's theory
of economic integration. 2' These first three sets of variables-concerns
over sovereignty and goals and functions of the organization-reflect
each state's national and political interests in joining international or-
ganizations.
22
Analysis of the remaining variables-number of member states,
level of economic, social and legal development, and type of govern-
ment-are an attempt to look inside each state for how the state can
function within each type of dispute resolution regime. These vari-
ables are suggested by a number of theories. First, economic analysis
of international organizations focuses on the costs and benefits of such
organizations. These costs can neatly be summarized as sovereignty
costs-loss of autonomy, loss of future flexibility, potential loss of
office-versus economic gains from liberalization, stability, and secu-
rity. ' This calculus is easy to understand and useful to apply at the
outset for understanding states' motivations in signing trade
118. For an earlier examination of the variables leading to integration, see Ernst B.
Haas, The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections On the Joy and Anguish of Pretheoriz-
ing, 24 INT'L ORG. 607 (1970).
119. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 117.
120. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 113.
121. BALASSA, supra note 115, at 2.
122. See also Shell, supra note 43, at 834-39. Shell uses a variety of international rela-
tions theories to categorize models of dispute resolution. His Regime Management Model is
based on regime theory where states balance free trade interests with autonomy interests.
The Efficient Market Model is based on free trade theory and liberalism. Finally, the Trade
Stakeholders Model is based on theories of liberalism and civic republicanism.
123. For more on balancing sovereignty and economic integration, see Joel P. Tracht-
man, L'Etat, C'est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and Subsidiarity, 33 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 459 (1992) and Susan Hainsworth, Sovereignty, Economic Integration, and the
World Trade Organization, 33 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 583 (1995).
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agreements.1 4 Economic variables should also matter in the choice of
dispute resolution regime. Trachtman's adoption of the theory of the
firm relies on power differentials and cost-benefit analysis to explain
cooperation. 25 This cost-benefit analysis must examine the economic
and social levels of each state and is also affected by the number of
states participating in the international organization. Second, liberal in-
ternational relations theory, coming from the Kantian tradition, would
argue that the type of government and legal culture is important in terms
of recognizing which private actors are actually represented by the gov-
ernment. 26 Finally, political bargaining theories also examine the
number of states and the type of government of these states involved in
international negotiations. Clearly, some of these variables are depend-
ent on one another and perhaps repetitive. All of these variables cannot
be equal in terms of determining state action. However, I believe for
clarity, it is preferable to look first at each set of variables independently
and then to evaluate their relative impact. This next section reviews
each theory briefly and identifies the political or economic variable
coming from the theory.
A. Concerns Over Sovereignty-Exit, Voice & Loyalty
When any state joins an international organization, there is, by defi-
nition, some relinquishment of sovereign power to the organization.'2 7
Some restriction is placed on the state (i.e., limits on tariff changes 28),
some procedure for grievances is designated (i.e., use of the ICJ for ter-
ritorial disputes versus use of force129), or some organization is created
for monitoring and coordinating state behavior (i.e., the Organization of
American States'30 ). In all of these cases, the sovereignty of a state, as it
is classically defined,' is limited. Thus, the issue for a state joining any
124. See Jay Smith, Policing International Trade (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Stanford University) (on file with author); see also Guzman, supra note 62 (explaining
why the economic gains from treaties cause less developed countries to sign investment
treaties that overly limit their sovereignty).
125. Theory of the Firm, supra note 19, at 543-49.
126. See Moravscik supra note 114, at 513.
127. "To varying extents, organizations have developed legislative or quasi-legislative
powers and dispute-settlement mechanisms raising common problems relating to relin-
quishment of sovereign prerogatives by members .... FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR.,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING v-vi (1993).
128. See GATT, supra note 51.
129. See UN Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 16.
130. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119
U.N.T.S. 3.
131. "Sovereignty is supreme authority, an authority which is independent of any other
earthly authority." LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 101 (1st ed.
1905). Sovereignty is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "the supreme, absolute, and
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international organization is to what extent it is willing to limit its sov-
ereignty. More collectively, the issue is what type of structure are
member states willing to create in order to assuage their concerns about
sovereignty.
Joseph Weiler answered these questions with regard to the creation
of the European Union 132 by using the Exit and Voice regime established
by Albert Hirschman in Exit, Voice and Loyalty.'33 Hirschman originally
applied these concepts in the framework of political economy to study
the behavior of individuals in companies, organizations and, at the
broadest level, states. He used the idea of voice to determine the ability
of the individual to have influence on the behavior of the organization
and to 'voice' their opinion.'34 Exit is the concept of leaving the organi-
zation, switching brands, or changing political parties when an
individual is not happy with the behavior of the larger entity.'35 Loyalty,
as used by Hirschman, is the dynamic by which individuals stay in or-
ganizations longer than they would otherwise and turn to the voice
mechanism to effect change rather than exit.
36
In his article, Weiler applied this construct to the history of the
European Union, examining the trade-off between political representa-
tion in decision-making and the ability of member states to selectively
exit, or ignore certain laws. He argued that as exit declines, the need for
voice increases. In the case of the European Union, as the European
Court of Justice ruled that EU rules have direct effect 37 and have su-
premacy'3 8 in the early 1960's, member states felt that more political
representation was necessary. This need for voice precipitated the
Empty Chair Crisis in 1965 and the Luxembourg Compromise in 1966
which permitted member states to veto any legislation directly affecting
their national security. These actions delayed the intent of the Treaty of
Rome to move to majority voting and kept the veto until the Single
European Act of 1986. This analysis of the trade-off between voice and
exit is an important one for any international organization and can be
directly applied to dispute resolution mechanisms.
uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed; supreme political author-
ity..." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 971 (6th ed. 1991). See also Louis W. Goodman,
Democracy, Sovereignty, and Intervention, 9 AM. INT'L L. & POCY 27, 27-29 (1993)
(giving historical analysis of sovereignty).
132. The Transformation of Europe, supra note 21.
133. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 117.
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id. at 4.
136. Id. at 77.
137. Van Gend en Loos, supra note 34.
138. Costa v. ENEL, supra note 34.
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1. The Need for Exit
The evolution of the European Union has severely limited the abil-
ity of member states to ignore both legislation passed and court
decisions. Court decisions have required timely implementation of leg-
islation, ' action in the face of non-implementation,14 compliance with
previous court decisions,' 4' and, more recently, damages to individuals
harmed by non-implementation. 42 Unless a member is totally going to
exit the European Union, blatant violation of the dispute resolution
mechanism is minimal.
43
To carry Hirschman's theory into other trade agreements, the ability
to selectively exit-to ignore particular rulings-is a distinct possibility.
For example, one of the primary reasons that GATT was finally re-
formed into the WTO was because of the increasing use of selective exit
by certain powerful member states (the United States, Canada, and
Europe included.)'" Clearly, one of the factors for any state to consider
in deciding which type of dispute resolution regime it would like to join
is the ability to selectively ignore decisions under the regime. That de-
termination is made by the agreement establishing the regime, which
will set forth whether decisions are binding and have supremacy.
A type of exit is the ability of states to prevent the regime from
making decisions about certain issues. Again, GATT provides a helpful
139. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94, and C-190/94,
Dillenkofer and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1996 E.C.R. 1-4845, [1996] 3
C.M.L.R. 469 (holding that Member State is responsible for damage suffered as result of
failure to transpose directive in good time).
140. See, Frankovich, supra note 34; Case 70/72 Commission v. Germany, supra note
109.
141. See, supra note 107 and accompanying discussion.
142. In 1991, the ECJ instituted remarkable advancement for the enforcement of com-
munity law through the preliminary reference ruling in Francovich, supra note 34. See Rene
Valladares, Francovich: Light at the End of the Marshall Tunnel, 3 U. MIAMI Y. B. INT'L L.
1 (1995). The ruling conferred liability upon a Member-State to an individual for damages
incurred by nonimplementation of a directive. Thus, because Italy failed to implement a
directive concerning the coverage of employees under insolvent employers, Italy was liable
for the damages the employees suffered.
143. Of course, there are many violations still not brought to court and members have
been able to find ways to avoid complete implementation. In addition, the idea that no mem-
ber would ever exit the EU has been proven to be false as the EU evolves. For example,
selective exit from the Maastricht Treaty was used by Denmark and the United Kingdom
regarding the monetary union. See Christos Hadjiemmanuil, European Monetary Union, the
European System of Central Banks, and Banking Supervision: A Neglected Aspect of the
Maastricht Treaty, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 105, 107-110 (1997).
144. See ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 55, at 352-355
(summarizing the increasing legal failures of the GATT in the 1980's and noting that GATT
was clearly more responsive to the powerful states). This type of selective exit could also be




example. While some states ignored GATT panel rulings,'45 other states
used the tactic of preventing a neutral GATT panel from even hearing
the dispute.46
A final type of selective exit from a dispute resolution regime is to
limit the neutrality of the decisionmakers. In dispute resolution regimes,
147the decisionmakers could range from a standing court, to rotating pan-
els appointed from experts,'4 8 to ad hoc appointees from the
government.'4 9 The ability of member states to influence the decision
politically is another way of permitting selective exit from those deci-
sions which would be too controversial domestically.
2. The Need for Voice
Weiler showed that as the ability to exit decreases, the need for voice
increases. '5 In an international organization, this can be reflected in a
number of ways. First, member states might choose to narrowly limit the
ability of the dispute resolution regime to hear disputes. For example,
states might be able to claim national security exceptions, as in NAFTA, 5'
145. See ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 55 at 151-54 (discussing
on the US-EC Pasta Subsidies case).
146. See ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 55, at 33-34, 54, and
68-69.
147. For example, the ECJ is a standing court. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & FRANCIS G.
JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1-2 (3rd ed. 1989).
148. The WTO and ICSID arbitral panels are appointed as needed from a list of ap-
proved experts. ICSID Convention, supra note 59; WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding,
supra note 83, at art. 8.
149. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 2001(3)(a), at 693.
150. The Transformation of Europe, supra note 21, at 2410-2412.
151. See, e.g., NAFTA Article 2102 on exceptions for national security:
... [N]othing in this Agreement shall be construed:
(a) to require any Party to furnish or allow access to any information the dis-
closure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential interests;
(b) to prevent any Party from taking any actions that it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war
and to such traffic and transactions in other goods, materials,
services and technology undertaken directly or indirectly for the
purpose of supplying a military or other security establishment,
(ii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations,
or
(iii) relating to the implementation of national policies or international
agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices; or
(c) to prevent any Party from taking action in pursuance of its obligations
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international
peace and security.
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or structure the dispute so that only certain questions are raised in front
of the regime, as in arbitration.
5 2
The second way to increase voice is in the scope and content of the
rules that are created under the treaty.' 3 At the outset of the treaty, the
entire organization can be limited as to the rules it covers. For example,
concerns about giving up sovereignty can be met by restricting the
treaty to the more narrow aim of free trade rather than pursuing a goal
of broader integration. The question of voice continues to be relevant
during the implementation of the treaty. If some organization exists it
will, at a minimum, monitor and report the behavior of its members.'
At a maximum, the organization will create rules to carry out the goals
of the organization.'55 States concerned with maintaining voice will limit
the types of cases permitted under the dispute resolution regime, limit
standing to states, and create voting procedures that ensure continued
voice in rule creation, such as vetoes or qualified majority voting.
3. The Existence of Loyalty
The concept of loyalty to international organizations is an interest-
ing one and deserves more than the brief examination given here. The
theory of loyalty, as Hirchmann uses it, suggests that members will
choose to utilize their "voice" to change an organization, rather than
"exit." The war between voice and exit is one that is continually fought
on the battleground of the EU'56 and can also be found on a smaller scale
NAFTA, supra note 2, at art. 2102 at 669-700.
152. This is similar to the point discussed supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text
about the limited scope of arbitrations under the Investment Arbitration Regime.
153. The Luxembourg Compromise is an example of maintaining voice as exit de-
creases by maintaining a veto over the rules created under the Treaty of Rome. See The
Transformation of Europe, supra note 21, at 2423.
154. See, e.g., Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 3, (1994) WTO website, (last visited Oct. 16,
1999) <www.wto.org/wto/legallfinalact.htm> [hereinafter Trade Policy Review Mechanism];
see also NAFTA supra note 2, art. 513 at 363; see also John P. Fitzpatrick, The Future of
The North American Free Trade Agreement: A Comparative Analysis of the Role of Regional
Economic Institutions and the Harmonization of Law in North American and Western
Europe, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 60-61 (1996).
155. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal Inter-
national Organizations, 42 J. CONF. REs. 3, 15 (1998) [hereinafter Why States Act].
156. For example, the Luxembourg Compromise discussed supra note 153 is an exam-
ple of maintaining loyalty and voice. Only the Single European Act, passed 10 years later,
resolved this conflict between voice and exit by providing for qualified majority voting.
Similarly, the decision by Denmark and the United Kingdom to stay out of the monetary
union demonstrates loyalty and exit. The United Kingdom continues to debate the advan-




in other organizations.'57 What is interesting is that the balance between
voice and exit is more clear when member states feel loyal to the inter-
national organization. This loyalty can stem from a variety of sources
including a political belief in the overall goals of the organization or the
conviction that the organization will benefit the domestic economy.
B. Function of the Organization-Mesoinstitution Theory
The second variable is the function of the organization stemming
from mesoinstitutional theory. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal cre-
ated the theories of mesoinstitutions in order to better understand formal
international organizations.'58 They argue that regime theory59 is incom-
plete without a more detailed understanding of why states cooperate.
The term "meso" stems from the concept that international organiza-
tions are somewhere between the centralized state and decentralized
anarchy written about so frequently in international relations theory."6
Furthermore, international organizations exist in order to perform func-
tions for states. Mesoinstitutional theory divides these functions
primarily into two categories-facilitating and producing. Abbott and
Snidal recognize, however, that many organizations lie somewhere
along a spectrum of cooperation.16' For the purposes of this article, I will
briefly describe each category and then discuss how each would struc-
ture its dispute resolution regime.
1. Facilitating Organizations
Facilitating organizations operate by promoting state cooperation
through four separate functions. By setting forth principles, norms or
rules, the facilitating organization has a normative function. This func-
tion can be performed without any structure at all.' 62 The second
function-the consultative function-also requires very little structure
in that organizations can provide for state interaction through meetings,
conferences, and similar gatherings. The supportive function is the third
function of a facilitating organization. Through this function, the inter-
157. For example, the US withdrew from UNESCO in protest over its policies and
funding. See U.S. Parts Ways with UNESCO, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1984, at Al. The US has
also withheld funding from the United Nations in an effort to promote reform. See DAVID P.
FORSYTHE, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 117-140 (1990)
(explaining the battle over UN assessments during the Reagan administration).
158. Mesoinstitutions, supra note 113.
159. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (Kenneth A. Oye ed., Princeton Univer-
sity Press 1986).
161. Mesoinsitutions, supra note 113.
162. See id. at 13.
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national organization provides research, information, tracking, and pos-
sibly agendas for future meetings. 66 Abbott and Snidal note that the
WTO Secretariat would be an example of an international organization
performing this type of supportive function in two ways. First the WTO
Secretariat researches state practices under the existing rules. Second, it
assists with dispute settlement by helping to form ad hoc panels under
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and by assisting the panel
itself.
A possible fourth function for the facilitating organization is the
initiative function. The secretariat of an international organization may
call members together on its own initiative and draft an agenda. Again,
Abbott and Snidal use the WTO as an example of this, citing a negoti-
ating text put forth by GATT Director-General Dunkel, the Dunkel
draft, as a catalyst in moving the Uruguay Round negotiations forward.
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism, under which member state trade
policies are monitored, is also given as an example of the initiative
function.' 4 It is clear that even without more formal dispute resolution
structures, the facilitating organization can encourage compliance with
the underlying trade norms.
2. Producing Organizations
Producing organizations are considered the more classic interna-
tional organizations with substantial bureaucracies and budgets and
concurrent losses in state independence. Abbott and Snidal analogize
these organizations to corporations where states are the owners but not
the managers.161 In exchange for both the monetary and sovereignty
costs, these producing organizations produce various benefits: rules,
technical assistance, information, legitimacy, and financial support.
These benefits can be grouped under two categories-efficiency and
legitimacy. Producing organizations provide gains in efficiency by
pooling risks or assets, managing joint production between member
states, and reducing transaction costs through the creation of coordina-
tion points-rules, standards and specifications. These organizations
also enhance legitimacy through their perceived neutrality and inde-
pendence. For example, actions that a state might not undertake
independently are laundered when these actions occur through an or-
163. See id. at 13-17; Why States Act, supra note 155, at 12.
164. Mesoinsitutions, supra note 113, at 17-18. See Trade Policy Review Mechanism,
supra note 154.
165. Mesoinsitutions, supra note 113, at 20-21.
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ganizaton. 66 Other functions performed by a neutral international or-
ganization include trustee, 67  allocator,' 68 information source, 6  or
community representative."0 Also, under the heading of legitimacy is
the concept that an international organization can act as a neutral arbiter
when disputes arise.
Abbott and Snidal analyze this neutral function in terms of dispute
resolution by dividing the potential roles between facilitative interven-
tion versus binding intervention. Facilitative intervention-through
good offices, mediation, inquiry, or fact-finding-reduces the transac-
tion costs of diplomacy by helping states overcome bargaining
deadlocks and generating possible solutions.' Binding intervention can
clarify rights and duties and interpret the underlying treaty.' The threat
of binding intervention is also, in and of itself, an important promoter of
compliance. "'
Thus, the variable coming from mesoinstitution theory is the func-
tion of the international organization. In terms of looking at the dispute
166. This function is called laundering. See id. at 28-30. One example would be the re-
allocation of EU dues to certain sectors of the economy. The traditional. underwriting of
agriculture would probably not be acceptable in a state-to-state form but are laundered
through the EU. Similarly, support to less economically developed regions-southern Italy,
Greece, etc-would probably not be as effective state-to-state. See also Why States Act,
supra note 155, at 18-19.
167. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 113, at 31-34. Abbott and Snidal use the exam-
ple of the UN Compensation Fund after the Gulf War as one example. Why States Act, supra
note 155, at 20-21.
168. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 113, at 34-35. The international organization is
relied upon to allocate scarce resources such as radio frequencies or financial resources. See
Why States Act, supra note 155, at 21-22.
169. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 113, at 35-36. The international organization can
create data directly, collect national data, and create standards for reporting. Even when
information is reported nationally, a neutral agency provides more legitimacy for this infor-
mation.
170. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 113, at 40-43. The international organization can
act as the representative of the community be it global like the UN or regional. See Why
States Act, supra note 155, at 24-26.
171. Mesoinstitutions, supra note 113, at 37. See also ROGER FISHER ET AL., BEYOND
MACHIAVELLI 123-32 (outlining how third party roles could be designed to better facilitate
international negotiations).
172. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 113, at 37.
173. See Mesoinstitutions, supra note 113, at 37; Geoffrey Garrett, International Coop-
eration and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market, 46 INT'L ORG
533, 555 (1992) (discussing the case where the threat of Commission action against Den-
mark caused the Danish government to pay damages without any case being brought).
Denmark awarded a contract to build the Great Belt Eastern Bridge to a domestic company
after receiving foreign bids. A British-French consortium threatened to bring a complaint to
the Commission. The Commission threatened to bring a case against Denmark and the Dan-
ish government paid damages to the consortium rather than proceed with the case. See id.;
see also Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979) (describing this negotiating phenomenon).
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resolution regime outlined in this article, it is clear that the Negotiation
Regime fits under a facilitative organization and the concept of facilita-
tive intervention. Binding intervention-through arbitration or a court-
is used in producing organizations and under the latter three dispute
resolution regimes. Therefore, if states prefer to utilize a facilitative or-
ganization, a Negotiation Regime is logical. However, if states plan to
create a producing organization-with the costs and benefits outlined
above-some binding intervention is part of that system.
C. Level of Economic Integration
The third variable is the level of economic integration planned for
the member states. The goals of economic integration clearly impact the
type of organization desired and the best regime for dispute resolution.
In the field of international trade, the goals of the organization can be
neatly divided into the level of integration desired by the member
states.1 74 While the level of economic integration desired depends on a
variety of factors, the primary factor is clearly the desire for economic
growth and stability. 5
1. General Tariff Reduction
A significant proportion of trade agreements avoids economic inte-
gration of any kind and focuses primarily on tariff reduction. The GATT
is a global example of an agreement to further tariff reduction without
promoting economic integration.7 6 The purpose of these agreements is
174. See BALASSA, supra note 115. Balassa categorizes the levels of economic integra-
tion as follows: free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union and
complete economic integration. Each of these levels will be explained further below. But see
Jacques Pelkmans, The Institutional Economics of European Integration, in 1 INTEGRATION
THROUGH LAW: EUROPEAN AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 318, 321, 324-25
(Mauro Cappelletti, et al. eds., 1986) (arguing that the five stages outlined by Balassa miss
the important distinction between negative integration-the removal of barriers-and posi-
tive integration-the transfer of economic decision-making to the union level).
175. See BALASSA, supra note 115, at 6. Balassa also notes that integration could help
counteract increased state intervention in the economy and help mitigate cyclical fluctua-
tions. See id. The belief that economic integration also leads to political stability is also
important. See, e.g., Robert Schuman, The Schuman Declaration (1950) reprinted in BRENT
F. NELSEN & ALEXANDER C-G. STUBB, THE EUROPEAN UNION 11 (1994).
176. See GATT, supra note 51. Note, however, that the WTO would probably be con-
sidered some form of economic integration because of the inclusion of GATS and TRIPS.
GATS and TRIPS are a widening, versus a deepening, of the traditional trade agreement by
including services and intellectual property. See John M. Fontecchio, The General Agree-
ment on Trade Services: Is It the Answer to Creating a Harmonized Global Securities
System?, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 115 (1994); see also Symposium, Intellectual
Property Law in the International Marketplace: Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights: Enforcement and Dispute Resolution, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1997); Michael J.
Chapman & Paul J. Tauber, Liberalizing International Trade in Legal Services: A Proposal
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not to coordinate policies, but rather to trade off economic benefits be-
tween members.' These basic reciprocal rights, such as most-favored-
nation status and national treatment rights, are the relatively uncontro-
versial backbone of these agreements.'78
2. Free Trade Agreement
The second level of a trade agreement is a free trade agreement. A
free trade agreement entails the reduction and eventual elimination of
tariffs between the member states on the goods covered by the agree-
ment.17 The typical free trade agreement also proposes the elimination
of other quantitative restrictions on trade including quotas and bans.
Finally, a free trade agreement permits the member states to maintain
their respective tariffs with regard to the remainder of the trading com-
munity. Most agreements still exempt certain strategic or otherwise
important goods from the free trade agreement.
3. Customs Union
The next level of integration is the customs union in which the
member states eliminate tariffs between themselves, and unify their tar-
iff levels with respect to the rest of the trading community.'8° A customs
union increases the integration between the member states and, argua-
bly, creates a more powerful trading bloc. Outside states must now
negotiate tariffs and other trade barriers with several states rather than
just the single state. Some examples of customs unions include the
Benelux customs union prior to its becoming part of the EU and the
for an Annex on Legal Services Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 16
MICH. J. INT'L L. 941 (1995).
177. See GATr, supra note 51 (noting in the Preamble that the method of achieving
GATT's goals was "[b]y entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs..."). Similar purposes also exist in bilateral or
other multilateral tariff reduction agreements. See, e.g., African, Caribbean and Pacific States-
European Economic Community: Final Act, Minutes, and Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of
Lome, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990) [hereinafter Lome Convention] (providing prefer-
ential access to the EEC market). Ironically, it is this convention which is now under attack at
the WTO level for providing unfair benefits in the Banana War between the U.S. and EU. See
sources cited supra note 49.
178. See THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 95, at 20.
179. See BALASSA, supra note 115, at 2; see NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 302(2); U.S.-
Israel Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., 24 I.L.M. 657 [hereinafter U.S.-Israel
FTA]; Central European Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 21, 1992, 34 I.L.M. 3.
180. See BALASSA, supra note 115, at 2; see also GATT, supra note 51, article XXIV,
sec 8 (discussing the definition of a customs union in GATT).
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relatively recent customs union between the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic. 8'
4. Common Market
The fourth level of integration is the common market. For many
years, this was the appellation used to refer to the European Economic
Community. 82 The common market is a customs union that moves be-
yond free trade in goods, eliminating barriers to the free movement of
the "factors" affecting the free movement of goods. This includes the
free movement of services, capital and labor.'83 By eliminating barriers
to free movement of services, including banking, insurance, travel agen-
cies, health care, and other professions, the common market promotes a
more integrated and open trade between the member states." The free
movement of capital between the states permits the true establishment
of cross-border enterprises and facilitates the free movement of goods
and services. Finally, the free movement of labor (often the most con-
troversial part of the common market) permits the workers in each of
the member states to go where the jobs are. The free movement of
goods and services will be facilitated by the ability of the citizens of this
common market to work in any of the member states.
5. Economic Union
The fifth level of integration is the economic union. The economic
union builds on the common market structure by beginning the har-
monization of national economic policies.' Those policies could
181. Czech Republic-Slovak Republic Customs Union Agreement between the Czech
Republic and the Slovak Republic dated October 28, 1992, entered into force January 1,
1993. See World Trade Organization, TRADE POLICY REVIEW: CZECH REPUBLIC 23-24
(Geneva, June 1996); Czechs, Slovaks To Form Customs Union, But Policies Seen Diverging
After Time, 44 Int'l Trade Rep. 1885 (Nov. 4, 1992); Czech Parliament Starts to Discuss
Agreements with Slovakia, CTK NEWS WIRE, Nov. 24, 1992.
182. See, for example, the Journal of Common Market Studies and the Common Mar-
ket Law Reports. There are also common markets in other regions. In Latin America, there is
the Andean Common Market (ANCOM) between Columbia, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador
and Peru in the Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969 28 I.L.M.
1165 [Treaty of Cartagena]; the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM), created through
an Annex to the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 946 U.N.T.S.
17; the Central American Common Market (CACM), General Treaty on Central American
Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960 455 U.N.T.S. 3 [Treaty of Managua], between El Sal-
vador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Guatemala; and MERCOSUR, supra note 6.
There is also the African Common Market between Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and
Morocco, dated April 1, 1962.
183. See BALASSA, supra note 115, at 2; Treaty of Rome, supra note 5, article 3.
184. See BALASSA, supra note 115, at 80-98.
185. The EU would be considered well on its way to full economic union. See Treaty
on European Union, supra note 5.
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include fiscal (i.e., inflation and interest rates), taxation, monetary (i.e.,
exchange rates), and social (i.e., employment policies and welfare).
Clearly, this level of integration requires more than coordination be-
tween the commerce departments because it involves regular executive
consultations about economic planning. This planning would most
likely be done through a separate organizational body with its own bu-
reaucracy to coordinate the myriad policies of the states.'86
6. Economic Integration
The final level of integration is full economic integration between
the member states."7 All of the economic policies-fiscal, monetary and
social-would be coordinated. This level of integration would also re-
quire a supranational authority to oversee implementation and
compliance with the rules, regulations, and decisions pertaining to eco-
nomic integration. 8' At this level of integration, there would no doubt
be additional laws to the constituent treaty with which compliance
would be necessary. Whereas the lower levels of integration usually
only require government action, integration at this level would also im-
pose restrictions and guidelines on private citizens to eliminate all
economic barriers between the member states. Foreign and security
policy could remain outside the realm of full economic integration but
almost every other type of policy could be affected.'89
The level of economic integration desired is the third variable-
along with sovereignty concerns and function of the international
organization-which is decided by member states based on their na-
tional interests when creating an international trade organization. These
first three variables are dependant upon the goals of the member states.
The next three variables discussed look at the realities of the member
states in the organization. Each of these variables-number of members,
economic development, and political and legal structure-clearly affect
the potential goals of any trade organization and impact on what type of
dispute resolution regime is most appropriate.
186. See, for example, Mesoinstitutions, supra note 113, at 21-27 on efficiency gains
from producing organizations. An economic union would have to be considered under this
category of organizations.
187. Examples of complete economic integration of constituent states include the
United States, Canada and Brazil.
188. See BALASSA, supra note 115, at 2.
189. For example, EU expansion into the subject areas of education, environment, im-
migration, abortion, and human rights could all be used as signs of progress toward complete
economic integration.
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D. Number of Member States
The importance of the number of member states to an international
trade treaty comes from two different disciplines. First, negotiation
theorists have determined that multiparty negotiations are clearly more
complex than bilateral gotiations. Understandably, the structure cre-
ated in an international organization must take account of the
negotiating complexities. An increased number of member states will
affect how decisions are made both in the creation of rules and in the
resolution of disputes.
Second, the economic gains of state cooperation are also affected by
the number of states involved. As Joel Trachtman writes, "we assume
that states enter the market of international relations in order to obtain
gains from exchange."' 9' Two of the potential sources of economic gain
from trade are economies of scale and economies of scope.192 Economies
of scale come from global business, global regulation or technological
economies of scale.'93 Economies of scope come from centralized pro-
duction and regulatory economies of scope. 94 Both the benefits of
economies of scale and scope increase over time and with increased fre-
quency of transactions. And all of these benefits depend on the size of
the potential economy concerned.'95
1. Bilateral Treaty
A bilateral treaty is often the simplest to understand and interpret.
Rarely will the states involved feel the need to create an additional body
under the treaty to interpret or monitor the treaty. The rules of the treaty
are relatively straightforward, as in a free trade agreement '96 or in a bi-
lateral investment treaty.'97 The treaty might also deal with specific
190. See, e.g., HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION, 251-355
(1982); see also INTERNATIONAL MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION (I. William Zartman ed.,
1994); DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY (Peter B. Evans, et al. eds., 1993) (focusing on the
problems of international bargaining and domestic politics as two-level games).
191. The Theory of the Firm, supra note 19, at 489. See Alan 0. Sykes, Comparative
Advantage and the Normative Economics of International Trade Policy, I J. INT'L ECON. L.,
49 (1998) for an excellent primer on the economics of trade.
192. See The Theory of the Firm, supra note 19, at 493.
193. See The Theory of the Firm, supra note 19, at 494. Global regulation decreases in-
efficient regulatory disharmony or evasion and encourages global business.
194. See The Theory of the Firm, supra note 19, at 494-95. Economies of scope occur
through "spillover" of international regulation. "Once several areas of international regula-
tion are established, economies of scope may be realized by regulating other areas." Id.
195. See, BALASSA, supra note 115, at 35-39 (discussing the impact of the size of the
union on economic gains).
196. See, e.g., U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 179.
197. See, e.g., Argentina-U.S. BIT, supra note 61.
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sectors of the economy.' 98 Usually the aims of the treaty will be limited
vis-a-vis integration'99 to narrow trade goals. As in non-trade bilateral
agreements, if compliance does not occur, the states would renegotiate
the agreement on an ad hoc basis, rather than submit the dispute to any
oversight body.
2. Several States
More recently, agreements among several states have proliferated as
neighboring states draft and join smaller international trade organiza-
tions in order to boost their own economies.2 0 Again, the goals of these
agreements can vary from simple investment treaties to new organiza-
tions, as in the case of MERCOSUR. The structure of these agreements
starts to become more complex. The concern with monitoring, harmoni-
zation, and compliance will lead certain of these organizations to create
oversight bodies, and even judicial bodies.2°'
3. Regional Agreements
At the next level up, trade agreements become even larger by at-
tracting members from the entire region. The clearest examples of this
level agreement are the European Union and the proposed Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas. With membership above 15 to 20 states, a
separate institution is a necessary to at least coordinate meetings of the
states if not to monitor compliance with the laws 2
4. Global Treaties
The largest type of trade organization is the World Trade Organiza-
tion with the implicit goal of global membership.23 The type of dispute
resolution mechanism required at this level is the subject of ongoing
198. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of United States of America and
the Government of Ghana for Sales of Agricultural Commodities, Feb. 8, 1990, U.S.-Ghana,
90 U.S.T. 77, KAV No. 2905; Statement Regarding the Agreement Between the United
States and Morocco Relating to the Agreement of June 25, 1987 for Sale of Agricultural
Commodities, October 20, 1988, U.S.-Morocco, 88 U.S.T. 355; KAV No. 1417.
199. But see Treaty Regarding the Inclusion of the Principality of Liechtenstein in the
Swiss Customs-Area, Mar. 29, 1923, Liech.-Switz., 2 L.T.S. 231. Liechtenstein is now con-
sidered part of Switzerland for economic purposes.
200. See, e.g., Treaty of Cartagena and Treaty of Managua, supra note 182.
201. See, e.g., MERCOSUR, supra note 6.
202. This would be consistent with the role of a facilitating organization as described
above.
203. In fact, current membership of the WTO is 134. WTO home page, (last visited
Sep. 20, 1999) <http://www.wto.org>.
Summer 19991
Michigan Journal of International Law
discussion. 4 Again, as the number of states grow, the need for over-
sight, information exchange, and general organization has also
multiplied. There is also no doubt that the number of potential disputes
is increased.
The number of member clearly impacts other variables. For exam-
ple, exit-the ability to either leave the organization or ignore decisions
from the dispute resolution mechanism-is clearly more difficult at the
extremes in the range of member states. In a bilateral agreement, exit
could result in the collapse of the underlying agreement. A blatant
breach of a bilateral treaty legally suspends the other state's duties un-
der the treaty . At the other extreme, few states could afford to
completely withdraw from (or never join) a global organization. The
jockeying over China's accession to the WTO is only one example of
this concern.26 The number of member states will also determine the
necessity for additional organizational structures. Again, a global or-
ganization, even if it is facilitative, will most likely set up a secretariat.
The number of member states also affects the level of economic of inte-
gration possible. Finally, in terms of legal factors discussed in the first
part of this article, standing is the factor most affected by the number of
member states. The argument has already been made that expanding
standing under the WTO would overwhelm the system.07
E. Similarity in Economic and Social Levels
Economic theories and cost-benefit analysis of international organi-
zation also require an examination of the economic and social
development of the member states. 20 8 In a cost-benefit analysis, states
enter organizations in order to reap an advantage .2  The international
204. See, e.g., Special Issue, WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1 J. INT'L EcON. L. 175
(1998); Symposium on the First Three Years of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 32
INT'L LAW. 609 (1998); John H. Jackson, Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging
Problems, I J. INT'L ECON. L. 329 (1998).
205. See Vienna Convention, supra note 47, art. 60.
206. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, U.S. and China Trying Hard for Breakthrough on Trade,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1999, at A8; Erik Eckholm, China's Entry into World Trade Organiza-
tion Is Called Unlikely, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1998, at A10.
207. See Philip M. Nichols, Participation of Nongovernmental Parties in the World
Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 318-19 (1996) (arguing that providing
standing to private actors in the WTO would create significant logistical problems).
208. The Theory of the Firm, supra note 19, at 495-98 (compares economic theories in
explaining why international organizations are created); see also Richard A. Posner, The
New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, 149 J. INST'L THEOR'L ECON 73
(1993) (compares two economic theories and notes that there is significant overlap).
209. Jay Smith uses the relative economic power of member states vis-h-vis one an-
other as a determining factor in how dispute resolution will be structured. Smith argues that
treaty value is determined by potential economic gain and increased by the security that the
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system is like a market and states can choose whether to engage in
transactions. The comparative economic levels between member states
impacts the evaluation of these costs and benefits to be gained by trad-• 211
ing.1 Although all states are ostensibly equal under international law,'
it would be naYve to think that economic power and social development
can be ignored.
1. Approximately the Same
Some trade treaties are signed among states with similar economic
development. Examples of this type of treaty could include the original
Treaty of Rome, creating the European Economic Community 212 and the
US-Canada Free Trade Agreement. 3 While differences clearly existed
between these states at the time of signing,24 these differences are small
compared to the rest of the global economy. If the economic strength of
the states is relatively similar, the goals of the treaty are also more likely
to be similar.2 5 Creating economies of scale and eliminating tariff barriers
agreement will be followed. The more binding the dispute resolution, the more trade benefits
will be realized. Treaty value must be balanced against the loss of policy discretion which
occurs as organizations are made more binding. Thus, he argues, the more trade-dependent
the economy is of a member state, the more binding the dispute resolution mechanism that
this state will favor. He also examines the states' relative global economic power. Smith,
supra note 124.
210. But see Joel Trachtman, Trade and... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Sub-
sidiarity, 9 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 32 (1998) (discussing the limitations of cost-benefit analysis
when applied to the conflict between trade values and other values).
211. See JANIS, supra note 18, at 179; see also UN Charter, supra note 16, art. 2(1)
("The [U.N.] is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members.")
212. Treaty of Rome, supra note 5.
213. Canada-United States: Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M.
281.
214. For example, in 1988 the per capita gross domestic product was $19,488 in the
United States and $18,058 in Canada. See 42 STAT. Y.B. 161, 175, U.N. Sales No. E/F.
97.XVII. 1.
215. For example, the Preamble to the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement re-
solves: .... To STRENGTHEN the unique and enduring friendship between their two nations;
To PROMOTE productivity, full employment, and a steady improvement of living standards in
their respective countries" U.S.-Canada FTA, supra note 213.
Accompanying legislative history also shows the goals of the agreement:
Mr. President, I would like to express my strong support for the United States-
Canada Free-Trade Agreement [FTA] which will not only serve to strengthen our
important economic and political ties with our great ally, Canada, but it will also
serve as an important model for our trading relations with the rest of the world.
134 CONG. REC. 24422 (Sep. 19, 1988) (statement of Mr. Bumpers).
... The United States-Canadian Free Trade Agreement or [FTA] which we have
before use today is, in short, a comprehensive plan to pull down most of the ex-
isting barriers to trade between our two countries. If the FTA is approved, it will
truly be a watershed event in modem economic history.
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are primary goals; opening new markets, tapping cheap labor, or bene-
fiting from less expensive consumer goods are less likely to be goals for
one or the other state. Furthermore, similar economic power affects the
willingness of each government to leave differences open for further
negotiation. Negotiating from equal power is more comfortable for
member states; judicial decisions are not viewed as necessary.
2. Clear Imbalance of Economic & Social Development
The alternative situation occurs when a treaty is concluded between
states that differ quite significantly in their level of development.
NAFTA could be considered one example, since the Mexican economy
is clearly weaker than its partners26as could treaties between the Euro-
pean Union and Caribbean or South American states. 2"7 The goals of
these treaties will differ from those among states at similar economic
levels. Furthermore, the type of dispute resolution mechanism may be
subject to more debate. While more powerful states may wish to retain
their political clout through a Negotiation Regime, less powerful states
would prefer a regime that is more politically neutral.2 8
134 CONG. REC. 24421 (Sep. 19, 1988) (statement of Mr. Glenn).
Compare this with the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome:
DETERMINED to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the Euro-
pean peoples,
DECIDED to ensure the economic and social progress to their countries by common
action in eliminating the barriers which divide Europe.
DIRECTING their efforts to the essential purpose of constantly improving the living
and working conditions of their peoples,
RECOGNIZING that the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in
order to guarantee a steady expansion, a balanced trade and fair competition,
ANXIOUS to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmoni-
ous development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions
and by mitigating the backwardness of the less favoured....
Treaty of Rome, supra note 5, at Preamble.
216. See Budgetary and Economic Analysis of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, CIS-NO:93-J932-30 (reporting at the time of the NAFTA negotiations, the per capita
GDP for the U.S. and Canada were between U.S.$20,000 to $25,000, while Mexico was at
$5,000); see also Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst, supra note 6, at 852-53; Smith, supra
note 124, at ch. 3.
217. See, e.g., Fourth ACP-EEC Lome Convention, supra note 177 (providing prefer-
ential access to the EEC market). For a US example, see Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., Laos
Conclude Bilateral Trade, Investment Agreements, USTR Announces, 14 INT'L TRADE REP.
1420 (Aug. 20, 1997).
218. See Smith, supra note 124, at 28 (arguing that dispute resolution mechanism in
Chapter 20 of NAFTA [close to a facilitated Negotiation Regime] is a direct result of the
US's relative power vis-A-vis Mexico and Canada).
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3. Assorted Levels of Development
As the number of member states increase, the likelihood is that a
simple division between developed and undeveloped economies is not
applicable. In the case of the larger regional or global organizations, the
member states will be at different stages of development. Even the
North-South division or First World-Third World division is too simple
a distinction to make since it glosses over many of the differences be-
tween states within these groups. Furthermore, simple tracking of the
recent WTO cases demonstrates that the disputes do not regularly fall
along economic divides."9
F. Government Type and Legal Culture of Member States
The last pair of variables to examine in determining regimes of dis-
pute resolution is the type of government and concurrent legal culture in
a member state. The importance of these variables comes from several
different political theories. First, bargaining theory notes that the type of
government in a member state affects the government's ability to nego-
tiate and the government's negotiation strategy." ° Second, the type of
government, and particularly the impact of a democracy, has been ex-
amined by theorists from Kant to liberal international relations theory.
Kant argued that international peace and domestic justice were inter-
twined."' Logically, international organizations would be more stable if
comprised of democratic states.2 The explosion of democracies around
the world, may, in time, make the question of treaties among states with
219. See WTO Website (last visited Sep. 23, 1999) <www.wto.org/wto
/dispute/bulletin.htm>. Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes reporting to date that
complaints filed by developed country Members is 93 matters/120 requests, complaints by
developing country Members is 29 matters/31 requests, and complaints by both developed
and developing country Members is 4 matters/10 requests. Id.
220. See Evans, et al., supra note 190; see also Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Do-
mestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988) (noting that the
transparency of a democracy requires different behavior when negotiating between states
than does totalitarian states).
221. "[Tlhe mutual self-interest in international commerce 'sooner or later takes hold
of every people, and it cannot exist side by side with war.'" Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to
Reform the United Nations: Lessons from the International Economic Law Revolution, 2
UCLA J. INT'L & FOR. AFF. 185, 186 (1997) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS
114 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. (1991))
[hereinafter How to Reform the United Nations]; see also Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian
Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1992).
222. See DEBATING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (Michael E. Brown et al. eds., 1996); Mi-
chael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205
(1983); Michael W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 1151
(1986); R. J. Rummel, Libertarianism and International Violence, 27 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 27
(1983) (demonstrating that liberal democracies have not engaged in war with one another).
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different types of governments moot. 23 In the meantime, differences
among states pertaining to the role of domestic political interests, the
power of domestic lobbies, and the independence of the judiciary will
continue to affect their involvement in the international economy.22 4
Furthermore, the differences between democracies and non-democratic
states will be highlighted as free trade is promoted.
Finally, recent literature has addressed the impact of lawyers and
litigation strategy in international organizations.2 It is clear that growth
in international trade agreements has boosted the practice of many
Washington, D.C. lawyers.226 Questions, however, are already arising
about appropriate representation before international tribunals and the
ability of small states as well as individual plaintiffs to find adequate
representation.
The recent Banana case in front of the WTO is a classic example of
this issue. The WTO panel held that the small Caribbean state of St. Lu-
cia was not entitled to hire private counsel if other states objected.227 In a
landmark decision, the Appellate Body of the WTO held that a state
could hire whomever they pleased. 228 Therefore, to ignore the impact of
lawyers on the implementation of these agreements would be nafve.
1. Democracies, Open Economies and Strong Legal Cultures
On the one hand, if all member states in an international organiza-
tion are democracies, the task is made easier. Under the circumstances,
states have similar assumptions about the rule of law, the separation of
judicial decisions from executive decisions, and underlying beliefs
223. See How to Reform the United Nations, supra note 221 (explaining how interna-
tional economic integration and increased constitutionalization of the United Nations would
help encourage the transition to democracy).
224. See Goodman, supra note 131, at 30 (arguing that democratic government should
be preferred globally for the functional reasons of open communication between states and
reduced transaction costs).
225. See Catherine Barnard, A European Litigation Strategy: The Case of the Equal
Opportunities Commission, in NEw LEGAL DYNAMICS OF EU 253 (Jo Shaw & Gillian More
eds., 1995); see also Peter Menyasz, Attorney Urges Private Party Participation to Protect
Commercial Interests at WTO, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 1612 (Sep. 23, 1998).
226. For articles on the general growth of trade lawyers in the 1980s, see Alexander
Stille & John C. Metaxas, Trade Lawyers, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 11, 1985, at 2. See also Marcia
Coyle, Once Tranquil Trade Law Hit By New Frenzy, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 20, 1987, at 1.
227. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, May 22, 1997, WT/DS27/R/USA at 7.10-7.12 (1997) (holding that private lawyers
would not be admitted to GATT and WTO Dispute Settlement proceedings). Interestingly, it
was the United States and Canada who objected.
228. Appellate Body, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, Sep. 9, 1997 WT/DS27/AB/R at 5-12(1997) (holding WTO mem-
bers are entitled to be represented by private counsel and that this allows developing country
members to "participate fully in dispute settlement proceedings.")
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about the power of the market."9 Both the EU and MERCOSUR have
drafted the requirement of democracy into their membership stan-
dards.2 30 The disadvantage of a democracy is that domestic interest
groups, such as labor, or certain sectors, such as agriculture or the gar-
ment industry, may block or change a proposed treaty because of
potential economic losses from open markets. 31 Instead of examining
the overall economic benefit for the state, each interest group may look
at past experience and narrowly focus the debate on whether or not it
will help them. Arguably, this type of public debate is skewed in favor
of well-organized groups, be it labor or a business association, rather
than consumers, the perennially unheard voice of the majority.232
Though states that host large numbers of lawyers may well curse
their fate, 33 the presence of lawyers is reflective of a state with healthy
229. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS (1776); see also Frederick M. Abbott, Trade and Democratic Values, I MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 9, 17-18 (1992) (explaining Adam Smith's and David Ricardo's economic
theories in favor of a liberal trading system).
230. The Treaty of Rome, supra note 5, at Preamble; MERCOSUR: Protocol of Brasilia
for the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 17, 1991, 36 1.L.M. 691. In fact, the threatened coup in
Paraguay in 1996 was avoided, in part, because of Paraguay's membership in MERCOSUR.
See Kevin G. Hall, Failed Coup Made Bloc Stronger, J. COM., May 1, 1996, at IA. "Member
countries [of MERCOSUR] and the US exerted strong pressure for Paraguay to stick with
democracy during the April 1996 stand-off between then- president Juan Carlos Wasmosy
and then-general Oviedo...". Ken Warn, Paraguay Rift Set to Mar Trade Summit, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998, at 6.
231. See DANIEL VERDIER, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 275 (1994); BETH
V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND GOVERNANCE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE: THE STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH 11 (1992). The debate about
fast track authority to negotiate free trade agreements is one example of this split in the U.S.
The debate seems to focus on who was helped or hurt by NAFTA with statistics showing
both job loss and job gain from the treaty. Furthermore, the divide between business, which
is in favor of more free trade, and labor, which fears the further erosion of jobs, can focus the
public debate away from the legislative procedures of fast track authority and, instead, on the
fear of what fast track authority will bring to each group. See Taylor, supra note 10; Helen
Dewar, Florida Torn Over 'Fast Track' Trade-Offs: Agricultural and Political Pressures
Keep State Straddling the Fence on Global Commerce, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1997, at Al;
David R. Francis, How NAFTA Impacts Flow of US Jobs South of Border, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 24, 1997, at 1; James Sterngold, NAFTA Trade-Off. Some Jobs
Lost, Others Gained, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, at Al.
232. Public choice theory is helpful in understanding the impact of interest groups in
trade. For more general information on public choice theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); Charles K. Rowley & William Thor-
becke, The Role of the Congress and The Executive in U.S. Trade Policy Determination: A
Public Choice Analysis in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
supra note 29, at 347; KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTER-
ESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 339-46 (1986); Paul B. Stephan III, Barbarians Inside the
Gate: Public Choice Theory and International Economic Law, l0 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
745 (1995); Symposium, The Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988).
233. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public
Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805 (1998).
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respect for the rule of law. A flourishing international practice bar can
be useful in a variety of ways. First, this bar will probably lobby for new
trade agreements in their own self-interest."' Second, the bar will be
important to implementing the agreement. In any type of structure, the
lawyers will be advising their clients on the rights and remedies pro-
vided by the agreement. Even with no international dispute resolution
structure, the bar may need to provide advice about domestic remedies
and lobbying. The plethora of new dispute resolution mechanisms has
created a need for legal assistance to wade through the rules and proce-
dures.235 Therefore, the number of sophisticated lawyers in a state does
and should impact the willingness of that state to join trade organiza-
tions with more sophisticated dispute resolution regimes.
2. Emerging Democracies with Controlled Economies
For emerging democracies, an international trade agreement will
pose other problems. First, it is more likely that the agreement may re-
quire change within the economy beyond a tariff reduction. Laws
regulating treatment of international companies, the protection of intel-
lectual property, and taxation will probably also need to be changed.
This agreement may be part of a larger plan to privatize industries,
eliminate wage and price supports, and encourage more free market in-
vestment. Second, because of the overall economic change, the potential
for severe economic dislocation is greater in the implementation of
these trade agreements. If this occurs, the democratic institutions them-
selves may be at risk as citizens look to renew the stability by returning
to the rule of previous governments.
2 3 6
A situation of either limited numbers of lawyers or few lawyers who
are actually trained in international trade lead to different problems for
those states. First, a much larger burden will fall on the government
counsel to explain and implement any trade agreement. In all circum-
234. In fact, the American Bar Association (ABA) supported expanding the right of
private parties to bring cases under NAFTA. See American Bar Association Section on In-
ternational Law and Practice, Reports to the House of Delegates: Dispute Settlement Under a
North American Free Trade Agreement, 26 INT'L LAW. 855, 859 (1992). See also, American
and Canadian Bar Associations Joint Working Group on the Settlement of International Dis-
putes, Settlement of Disputes Under the Proposed Free Trade Area Agreement, 22 INT'L
LAW. 879 (1988) (proposing a reference procedure from national courts in which individuals
could bring cases to a Joint Canada-United States Free Trade Tribunal).
235. "Not only the size, but also the emphasis of trade law practice has undergone a
dramatic shift, lawyers say. Once focused on tariff and quota disputes, lawyers today often
are concerned with the complex interplay of rules set by nations and by the WTO." Josh
Karlan, Fifty Years of WTO-and Legal Work, NAT'L L. J., June 1, 1998, at A14.
236. The threat to democracy in the Russian Federation because of economic instability
is a prime example.
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stances, private actors are likely to be unfamiliar with a new dispute
resolution system. The problem in a state with few lawyers is that the
learning curve will be much longer. Informing clients about the new law
and training lawyers in the procedures will fall more directly to gov-
ernment counsel or to hired foreign counsel. Companies may move
more slowly in adjusting to the new rules or may not take advantage of
new rights provided under the agreement.
Moreover, governments of smaller states may feel that it is neces-
sary to hire foreign counsel to represent them in these new global
mechanisms."' Over time, this situation may both harm the international
organization and the state. Countries may not feel so invested in a proc-
ess which requires them to use foreign counsel. They may also be less
comfortable revealing state practices to someone who is not part of the
government. Their citizens and their own domestic attorneys may feel
cut out of this new dispute resolution process and withdraw in fear, re-
sentment or suspicion rather than learn and actively participate. In the
end, this phenomenon can only harm the credibility and integrity of the
dispute resolution mechanism. The suspicion that many Europeans have
for the European Union would no doubt be magnified if their own do-
mestic attorneys and judges were not involved in the decisions that
affected their lives so directly. Therefore, when creating these interna-
tional dispute resolution mechanisms, member states and the
organization itself should think about what type of structure they are
creating and the education they will need to provide to their own citi-
zenry in order to truly understand and support the new organization.
3. Totalitarian Governments
The irony is that negotiating with a dictatorship is, in some ways,
very simple. If the leader signs the agreement, it is unlikely that any
domestic pressure will prevent ratification or implementation. The
problem rests more with the type of economy that exists in the state
and that state's ability to provide national treatment to foreign compa-
nies. When things go wrong, foreign companies will expect remedies
at the domestic level that may not be available.238 In this case, appro-
priate and effective remedies at the international level are necessary to
truly encourage the economic rights and benefits provided for by the
international agreement.
In addition, a totalitarian government will address the costs and
benefits of trade agreements differently. In a nutshell, states trade off
237. See supra notes 227-28 (the Banana case) and accompanying discussion.
238. See, e.g., MASHAALAH RAHNAMA-MOGHADAM ET AL., DOING BUSINESS IN LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: FINANCIAL OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS (1995).
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sovereignty costs for economic gains in these organizations. This cal-
culus for democracies has been well explained by Trachtman, Smith,
and others. 2 9 For totalitarian governments, the trade-off must be calcu-
lated differently. First, the economic gains to consumers would arguably
be less important to these governments. Without a voting public, leaders
will clearly be less inclined to value that impact. Secondly, binding dis-
pute resolution regimes often give more power to the judiciary vis-ii-vis
the executive branch.140 The strengthening and increased independence
of the judiciary, both domestic and international, is clearly alien and
perhaps risky to a totalitarian government. Furthermore, the totalitarian
government would find this particular sovereignty cost more expensive
and more threatening than a democracy.
IV. WHICH REGIME WHEN?
This article first outlined the four current dispute resolution re-
gimes. Next, the article examined political and economic factors based
on a variety of interdisciplinary theories relating to international organi-
zations. The next task is to bring these two segments together and make
some conclusions about which dispute resolution regime will be most
appropriate given a set of political and economic factors.
A. Negotiation Regime
The Negotiation Regime relies on ad hoc rule-making and diplo-
macy between the states in order to resolve disputes. This regime is
used only between states; individuals usually are not granted rights un-
der the trade treaty. Neither supremacy nor transparency are goals of
this type of regime. Furthermore, states enforce compliance with the
outcomes of negotiation through renewed negotiation, rather than any
structural penalties.
1. Concerns with Sovereignty
The Negotiation Regime of dispute resolution makes most sense to
those states concerned with their sovereignty. Negotiation provides
"voice" directly by ensuring that states are only bound by those inter-
pretations of law to which they expressly agree. Negotiation is the
ultimate dispute resolution mechanism for giving parties control over
239. Essay in Trade Governance, supra note 8; Hainsworth, supra note 123; Theory of
the Firm, supra note 19; Smith, supra note 124.
240. See Transformation of Europe, supra note 21, at 2426 (noting why domestic
judges were so willing to use the article 177 procedure in the European Union).
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the outcome.2"' Negotiation also provides parties with "exit" from the
original trade agreement since the negotiation can modify the rules with
which the states choose not to comply. A desire to renegotiate could
arise because certain trade concessions granted in the agreement are no
longer palatable or because one of the economic and social factors dis-
cussed below-inter alia, domestic political pressure or fear of a judicial
process which does not exist domestically-has become an issue.
2. Type of Organization
A Negotiation Regime is at the heart of a facilitating organization.
The dispute resolution described in Abbott and Snidal for facilitating
organizations discusses good offices and mediation.2 Even the func-
tions of convening meetings and providing information would not
require any type of dispute resolution beyond a Negotiation Regime.
3. Goals of Economic Integration
This regime would work best when states are not interested in har-
monizing their laws and the goals of integration are limited to lowering
tariffs and increasing trade. When states have a goal of further integra-
tion such as a common market or economic union, the number of rules
to be interpreted and applied could overwhelm any ad hoc system. For
example, the informal and provisional system at MERCOSUR could
clearly be at odds with its goals of integration.243 At the very least, some
oversight body is necessary in order to truly track implementation of the
trade agreement and, if desired, to provide interpretations of the rules.
The importance of consistent interpretation and efficient dispute resolu-
tion is increased exponentially as the trade agreement moves further
toward integration. In a case where the rule changes apply simply to
tariffs and some non-tariff barriers, ad hoc dispute resolution may be
possible.
4. Number of Member States
In a trade agreement with many states, an ad hoc system of negotia-
tion may become unworkable. That is because either the states must
negotiate one-on-one sequentially to deal with noncompliance or all the
states must convene in order to jointly modify the treaty. Both of these
options are time-consuming and inefficient in an agreement with nu-
241. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3-6 (1992); Frank
E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide
to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEG. J. 49, 50-51 (1994).
242. Why States Act, supra note 155, at 22.
243. See Dispute Resolution as a Catalyst, supra note 6.
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merous members.'" Therefore, a Negotiation Regime works best with a
limited number of states.
5. Similarity in Economic and Social Levels
Relying on negotiation for dispute resolution favors those states
who are more economically powerful. Because powerful states can
link any particular trade dispute to trade in general, economic aid and
other economic incentives, weaker states are less likely to prevail in a
dispute over trade compliance even when legally their position may be
correct. It is, therefore, understandable that when agreements are
made between states at different economic levels, the more powerful
states will push for a system that relies more on diplomacy .1 5 The
weaker state may argue strenuously for a more neutral regime of dis-
pute resolution without success. When evenly balanced states are
signing a trade agreement, a Negotiation Regime may be less attrac-
246
tive. Once states have agreed on a set of trade rules, having a neutral
regime to implement those rules has the advantage of shielding the
system from domestic pressure (somewhat)2 47 and of being much more
efficient than the alternative of requiring the states to sit down and
renegotiate each trade dispute.
6. Government Type and Legal Culture
As discussed above, a Negotiation Regime does not shield
a government from domestic political interest groups. In a democracy,
there will be continuing pressure on the government to protect
that industry,248  continue those subsidies,249  retaliate
244. See, e.g., RAIFFA, supra note 190. The problems with GATT prior to the WTO
demonstrate the difficulty of negotiating dispute resolution in a regime with global member-
ship.
245. See for example Smith, supra note 124, ch. 3, at 19-23 (discussing Chapter 20 of
NAFrA). See also James R. Holbein & Gary Carpentier, Trade Agreements and Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms in the Western Hemisphere, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 531 (1993).
246. See Smith, supra note 124, at 27-28 (explaining the more adjudicatory regime in
the WTO).
247. See JANIS, supra note 18, at 125 (pointing out that a decision from an international
tribunal can be more palatable domestically than negotiating rights away where a govern-
ment could be held directly responsible).
248. See I. M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS 69-73
(1986). As a result of the "second oil shock of 1979" the Japanese automobile industry
exported a significant number of fuel efficient vehicles into the United States. Id. at 69-70.
American sales significantly dropped, threatening a "symbol of U.S. economic supremacy."
Id. at 70. Not only did the Chrysler Corporation, the Ford Motor Company, and the UAW
lobby for protection, but so did American politicians and legislatures. See id. at 70.
249. See JOHN MCCORMICK, THE EUROPEAN UNION: POLITICS AND POLICIES 240-249
(1996) (discussing the problems of trying to reform the common agricultural policy of the
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unilaterally,250 and to link trade policy with foreign policy. 5' While
special interests will be in favor of a system that protects their ability to
influence their government, the government itself might be more
comfortable with a system that could provide cover for politically
unpopular decisions.
On the other hand, democracies will also be more comfortable with
a judicial system that mirrors their own. The respect for the rule of law
and independent judiciary is likely to be far more ingrained in states that
already have that system domestically. Non-democratic states are more
likely to be suspicious of any judicial system utilizing a "Western" or
"foreign" idea. 52 These states may prefer a Negotiation Regime that
protects the decision-making power of the national leader. In addition,
these states, which almost always have controlled economies, may fear
a foreign body imposing change on the domestic economy too quickly.
To the extent that any state feels that it does not yet have a suffi-
cient number of lawyers trained in international trade, this Negotiation
Regime will clearly be preferred. The responsibility for knowledge of
the law will be limited to the government. The need for additional edu-
cation and awareness about the legal procedures of the new trade
agreement will be nonexistant. Therefore, for developing states, this
regime may be the easiest to implement in the short term.
B. Investor Arbitration
The second regime for dispute resolution is investment arbitration.
Under this regime, individuals have some rights under the trade treaty
and have the ability to bring an arbitration case against the state violat-
ing the rules under the treaty. These arbitration decisions are binding as
to the damages awarded but do not provide for changing the law of the
violating state. These decisions have no supremacy over domestic law.
EU); see also Chad Bowman, Agriculture Lags in World Trade Reform, A Priority in '99,
U.S. Trade Official Says, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 2025 (Dec. 2, 1998).
250. See, e.g., The Limits of Economic Power, supra note 94.
251. See, e.g., Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996
(Helms-Burton Act), 104 Pub. L. No. 114, 110 Stat. 785; Iran and Libya Oil Sanctions Act of
1996, 104 Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § 22G (1997) (the
"Massachussetts Burma Law" which prohibited procurement from any business doing busi-
ness with Myanmar). This law was held to be an unconstitutional violation of the federal
government's prerogatives in foreign policy. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker,
26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998).
252. For example, see discussion supra note 206 on China's accession to the WTO.
Only the more Western Arab countries such as Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates are members of the WTO. Oman and Saudi Arabia are observer states
that have applied to officially join the WTO. See Members of the WTO, WTO Website (last
visited October 20, 1999) <www.wto.org>.
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Arbitration decisions, depending on the procedure chosen, may have
some transparency in terms of rule publication but may not provide for
publication of the decision and the legal reasoning. Enforcement of ar-
bitration decisions depends on whether the violating state provides for
judicial enforcement of arbitration decisions.
1. Concerns with Sovereignty
Admittedly, being subject to arbitration is a novel step for many
states. Even if states were willing to enforce arbitration awards in their
own courts, states rarely waived their sovereign immunity to any type of
case against them. Only with the creation of ICSID and the evolution of
the restrictive immunity theory, did states begin to accept arbitration
against them.253 Even then, the waiver of immunity occurred on case-by-
case basis.254 In the 1990's, the United States began to use ICSID as the
dispute resolution mechanism of choice in many of its bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BIT's). 255 These agreements, and NAFTA, now provide a
blanket waiver of immunity for any case arising under the relevant
treaty.256
The sovereignty given up in Investor Arbitration Regime is mini-
mal. "Exit" in terms of selective non-compliance does become more and
more difficult (and would result in an economic backlash on the part of
investors). On the other hand, "voice" is maximized in that the state has
the ability to frame the questions open to arbitration and certain reme-
dies are completely precluded. Arbitration panels do not order a state to
change its laws. By virtue of the extremely low level of integration that
usually applies in this regime, the limited remedies, and possible prob-
253. Under the traditional theory of immunity, states had absolute immunity for all
acts. Under the restrictive theory of immunity, only public acts of the state are immune.
When the state acts as a trader in the market, those private commercial acts are not immune.
See, e.g., the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra note 77.
254. See the discussion of the SOABI case in front of the French Court of Cassation for
an example of the pitfalls of immunity rules that may interfere with the execution of ICSID
awards. Parties should address the issue of immunity directly by means of appropriate waiv-
ers of immunity. See George R. Delaume, Decisions of Regional and Foreign Courts, 86 AM
J. INT'L L. 138, 142 (1992).
255. See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Albania Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, Jan. 11, 1995, U.S.-Alb., S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-19 (1995), art.
IX, §§ 4, 6. "Each Party hereby consents to the submission of any investment dispute for
settlement by binding arbitration .... Id. at § 4. "Any arbitral award rendered pursuant to
this Article shall be final and binding on the parties due to the dispute. Each Party shall carry
out without delay the provisions of any such award and provide in its territory for the en-
forcement of such award." Id. at § 6.
256. See NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1122 (Consent to Arbitration).
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lems of enforcement in the courts, this regime of dispute resolution has
the most "voice" of the adjudicatory methods.
2. Type of International Organization
As states determine that they desire an organization that produces
law, the dispute resolution regime must also move along that contin-
uum. Investor arbitration is the first step in terms of providing "binding
intervention. 257 This function ensures that the rules and norms as out-
lined by the underlying treaty will be enforced.
3. Goals of Economic Integration
Where the goals of integration are minimal, investor arbitration
provides a remedy for aggrieved individuals. This remedy is provided
by forfeiting the ability of the arbitration panel to further push integra-
tion. In arbitration, the questions for dispute will be narrowly construed
to deal with only the dispute at hand. When the level of integration is
minimal, a consistent body of law that provides precedent and transpar-
ency is not as important as when the level of integration is higher.
4. Number of Member States
Because arbitration is done on a case-by-case basis, this system
could work well regardless of the number of states involved. Further-
more, if decisions are publicized between the member states, some
transparency is provided in the system in order to help states and inves-
tors understand the interpretation of the law. However, the ad hoc nature
of arbitration panels and their rotating personnel have the potential for
creating confusion for investors, thus diminishing predictability and in-
creasing investor insecurity. The greater the number of member states,
the greater number of disputes that may arise over interpreting the same
rules. The greater number of disputes, the greater number of potential
arbitration decisions that may or may not build upon one another. The
danger of inconsistent application of the treaty increases exponentially
with each new member to the treaty. Therefore, this system would work
best in bilateral or small multilateral arrangements.
5. Similarity in Economic and Social Levels
One of the great advantages of this regime is that differences be-
tween economic levels is minimized. Clearly these differences will
manifest themselves in the content of the treaty itself and may also
257. Why States Act, supra note 155, at 15.
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manifest themselves in terms of historic aversion to arbitration. For ex-
ample, the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America emerged as a response to
power imbalances. 58
Investor arbitration has several elements that prove interesting in
terms of state power. First, because each case is brought by an individ-
ual investor against another government, a government does not have to
make the highly politicized choice of bringing a case. Instead, this is a
choice left to the investor who will decide based on his own economic
loss and chance of success in arbitration. Second, the domestic courts
are left out of the equation until the enforcement stage-again insulat-
ing this decision from domestic politics. Third, like any other
international adjudication, the decision is from a neutral party and may
even provide political cover for the violator. Of course, like any other
type of adjudication, those with more resources and more lawyers will
have an advantage in the process, 259 but this process is clearly better for
the less powerful states than the Negotiation Regime.
6. Government Type and Legal Culture
Under this regime of dispute resolution, the type of government of
the member state is also relatively unimportant. As long as each state
provides for enforcement of arbitration awards (and really does enforce
awards) and has waived its immunity under the treaty, other member
states and their investors need not concern themselves with the domestic
structure, stability or rule of law (other than how these factors would
affect their investment.) In terms of the adjudicatory dispute resolution
regimes discussed, this regime relies the least on the existence of a
democratic model of government. In a treaty between states with vastly
different government types, this regime may well provide the most fea-
sible option. International arbitration is the oldest form of adjudication
between states2 and will probably be most acceptable to those govern-
ments which have little experience with an independent judiciary.
258. The "Calvo Clauses" were developed in the mid-1800's in response to European
diplomatic intervention in Latin American countries. The doctrine's two basic principles of
"national treatment", which provides that foreign nationals will not be accorded greater
privileges than citizens, and "no diplomatic intervention", which provides that claims of
foreign nationals cannot be pursued through either diplomatic or forceful intervention, are
embodied in the constitutions and statutes of Latin American states. These clauses also tra-
ditionally prevented a state from submitting to arbitration claims by foreign nationals. See
Christopher K. Dalrymple, Politics and Foreign Direct Investment: The Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency and the Calvo Clause, 29 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 161 (1996).
259. There have been many articles written about the advantages of litigation for those
with money, and the clear disadvantages for those with limited financial resources. See, e.g.,
Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1983).
260. See JANIS, supra note 18, at 109-117.
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Lawyers, of course, are happy with any procedure that requires their
help. As we move from regime to regime, arbitration is preferred by
lawyers over negotiation between states. Furthermore, a growing num-
ber of lawyers have experience with arbitration and are more than happy
to sell this to both investors and states. Because many lawyers have had
experience with domestic arbitration, there is likely to be a sufficient
number of trained lawyers in most developed states. Unlike the unfa-
miliar procedures of an international panel, far less additional training
of the bar is necessary to successfully implement this regime of dispute
resolution. Therefore, out of the adjudicatory regimes, the Investor Ar-
bitration Regime is best when there are concerns about the experience
and training of the lawyers in the member states.
C. International Adjudication
Under the International Adjudication Regime, private actors are not
granted rights directly. Rights under this regime accrue to states that are
also the only ones granted standing before the dispute resolution body.
Under this regime, decisions are supreme to domestic law but are not
integrated further into domestic law, unless states take steps to give
them effect. Transparency in the International Adjudication Regime can
be very good. Rules and decisions are published, with decisions pro-
viding persuasive authority for future cases. Increasingly, this regime
provides for enforcement as well.
1. Concerns with Sovereignty
While the International Adjudication Regime has limited supremacy
in that decisions are not integrated into domestic law, there is still
clearly the intent that decisions emanating from this regime are supreme
and should be followed. The question of sovereignty arises since states
are relinquishing their ability to "exit" from the regime. Even with only
five years of cases from the WTO, it is apparent that domestic concerns
over some of the decisions raise important sovereignty issues and le-
gitimate questions of national interests versus global goals.26' This
261. See Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31 (June 30,
1997); European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), United States, WT/DS26/R (June 30, 1997); European Communities-
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Producers (Hormones), Canada, WT/DS48/R (June 30,
1997); United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra
note 40. The above cases are all clear examples of cultural, social, or environmental issues in
which the states have invested a great deal of identity or political commitment. By compari-
son, NAFrA has a specific cultural industries exception. See NAFrA, supra note 2, art.
2106; Jeffery Atik, Identifying Antidemocratic Outcomes: Authenticity, Self-Sacrifice, and
International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 229 (1998) (noting the self-sacrificing
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regime balances the limited "exit" ability with increased "voice" by
granting each state membership in the dispute resolution body. For in-
stance, the WTO agreement demonstrates "voice" by allowing each
member state to limit the extent of the tariffs covered under the agree-
ment. The ongoing debates, about investment laws and financial
services262 exemplifies the concern with relinquishing yet more sover-
eignty to a regime that provides for little "exit" once a complaint is
lodged.263
One last interesting note about this regime is the concept of
"loyalty" that Hirschman also uses to explain behavior. Once states
have invested in creating an international adjudication regime, the con-
tinuation and success of it relies on the states' "loyalty" to the regime.
Again, the responses to unpopular decisions of the WTO demonstrates
the tug-of-war between following current national sentiment and up-
holding the integrity of the institution.26
2. Type of International Organization
This type of dispute resolution regime is also consistent with the
producing organization as outlined by Abbott and Snidal. The organiza-
tion will use its neutrality and independence in order to bind states and
ensure compliance. In terms of enforcement, an International Adjudica-
tion Regime has important benefits for strengthening norms and
behavior in which states engage in order to protect certain interests). The battle over certain
cultural values continues. See Anthony DePalma, 19 Nations See U.S. as Threat to Cultures,
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 1, 1998, at El (discussing the perceived negative impact of U.S. free trade
on foreign cultures); Canada, U.S. Exchange Proposals in Start of Talks Over Magazine
Advertising Dispute, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 208 (Feb. 3, 1999) (discussing threatened U.S.
retaliation for a proposed Canadian law, written in response to the above WTO ruling, which
prohibits foreign magazine publishers from selling advertising aimed primarily at the Cana-
dian market).
262. See Louis Uchitelle, Global Tug, National Tether; As Companies Look Overseas,
Governments Hold Strings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at D1 (noting the debate over the
Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI)); see, e.g., WTO Financial Services Pact to
Enter Into Force March 1, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 265 (Feb. 17, 1999).
263. But see R.W. Apple, Jr., Split Over Cuba Is Eased By U.S. and Europeans, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1997, § 1, at I (showing the ability of the U.S. to prevent the Helms-Burton
act from reaching the WTO Dispute Settlement Body by claiming there was no jurisdiction).
Cf David E. Sanger, Europeans Drop Lawsuit Contesting Cuba Trade Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 1998, at A8.
264. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, U.S. Won't Offer Trade Testimony on Cuba Embargo,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1998, at Al (discussing the impact of bringing the Helms-Burton to the
WTO); Thomas E. Skilton, GA7 T and the Environment in Conflict: The Tuna-Dolphin Dis-
pute and the Quest for an International Conservation Strategy, 26 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 455
(1993) (reacting to the GATT decision against the United States' law banning the import of
tuna caught with non-dolphin friendly nets). On the other hand, states want to preserve their
right of access to the WTO. The U.S., with all of its complaints about the WTO, has already
been the plaintiff in 50 cases at the WTO.
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encouraging compliance."' Furthermore, as a "manager of enforce-
ment", International Adjudication Regimes can ensure that enforcement
and retaliation are not disruptive to the larger international commu-
266nity. Because the international organization can clarify, legitimize,
and launder retaliation, it strengthens the underlying regime compared
to the risks of unilateral and unlimited retaliation under a decentralized
system of enforcement.267
3. Goals of the Economic Organization
This regime is best used when the goals of integration are limited.
Because of the limited standing and supremacy of the regime, real
change in the domestic economies is going to be more difficult to
achieve. As the EU has demonstrated, it takes numerous domestic cases,
an active oversight body in the Commission, and true supremacy in or-
der to accomplish the higher levels of integration. Therefore, tariff
reduction and some selective harmonization of non-tariff barriers is
probably most realistic for this type of regime where states may bring
cases dealing with issues at the federal or national level. While states
could attempt to use this regime if a higher level of integration were
desired, such as a common market, the restrictions on standing and lim-
ited impact of decisions would require active state support and
continued intervention in order to accomplish that level of integration.
The convergence of these factors is unlikely.
4. Number of States
One of the benefits of an International Adjudication Regime is its
ability to handle a large number of states. Once an agreement is negoti-
ated (clearly a more arduous task with more states), the regime itself is
relatively easy to operate regardless of the number of states involved.
The limited standing afforded by this regime actually helps in this re-
gard in that the docket is much smaller than if standing were permitted
for private actors.26' The clear rules of the regime also make it easy for
states to use it simultaneously. Cases can proceed along separate sched-
ules and on timelines established by the regime rather than requiring the
maneuvering and coordination that is necessary under, for example, the
Negotiation Regime. States are not dependent upon the domestic politi-
cal cycles or national negotiations of every member state but are able to
265. See Why States Act, supra note 155, at 26-27.
266. See id. at 27.
267. See id. at 27.
268. See, Nichols, supra note 207.
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pursue complaints between themselves on a one-on-one basis by using
the International Adjudication Regime.
5. Similarity in Economic and Social Levels
The similarity in economic levels-if the states are approximately
the same, imbalanced, or mixed-is only an indirect variable for this
regime. The economic level matters more regarding the goals of the
trade agreement that typically choose an International Adjudication Re-
gime rather than the operation itself. In other words, if the goals of
integration are more limited (i.e., selected tariff reduction) a mixture of
economic levels may well be the catalyst that promotes such an agree-
ment. 69 States may desire this type of agreement expressly because their
economic levels differ and there could be joint benefits to opening their
respective economies to each other.
On the other hand, states may desire further integration at the free
trade level or a customs union, in which case the number of states in-
volved begins to exponentially make the initial trade agreement much
more difficult to attain. This does not directly affect the type of dispute
resolution regime chosen but does make it more likely that an Interna-
tional Adjudication Regime, if established globally, would be used at a
lower level of integration.
6. Government Type and Legal Culture
The International Adjudication Regime is based on the concept of
an independent judiciary and a respect for the rule of law. Therefore, it
will probably work better with states that include these concepts in their
own domestic system. While we have seen a wide variety of govern-
ment types in the membership of the WTO, 270 it is unclear how much
these states really agree with the use of this type of adjudication. Of
course, the point could be that it is irrelevant-states make a determina-
tion to join based on economic needs and a cost-benefit analysis and are
forced to accept the type of dispute resolution regime. Furthermore,
while it might be incongruous or inconsistent for a state to accept inde-
pendent adjudication at the international level and resist it domestically,
there is nothing that says it cannot be done.27' In the end, however, I be-
269. In other words, industrialized states would benefit from new markets while less
advanced states would benefit from cheap exports. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 124; A The-
ory of the Firm, supra note 19; BALASSA, supra note 115.
270. For example, WTO members include non-democracies such as Bahrain, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Nigeria.
271. See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 I.C.J. 803 (Dec. 12, 1996); Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.) 1991
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lieve that it is more likely that the International Adjudication Regime
will work better with democratic states committed to upholding the rule
of law. This impacts other factors including concerns with sover-
eignty-a democratic state will have more "loyalty" to this type of
regime-and with the ability of its lawyers to operate in the regime, as
discussed below.
Because the International Adjudication Regime is only open to
states, government lawyers will be the most involved in this regime.
Skilled lawyers who understand the international trade system will be
needed in order for states to successfully pursue their cases in front of
international tribunals. Concern with lack of training has already led
some states to hire private lawyers in order to represent them.27 Clearly,
this type of dispute resolution regime places a burden on states in which
the government lawyers have not been adequately exposed to trade law.
Unlike the Negotiation Regime where governments can rely on the tra-
ditional diplomatic corps, this regime shifts the responsibility to those
with legal training and expertise. This type of shift could also raise ad-
ditional sovereignty concerns, in particular with governments that have
been more comfortable using diplomats rather than lawyers to resolve
disputes. Furthermore, if the lawyers are hired from other states, the
sovereignty concerns could increase. Under that scenario, cases of na-
tional importance would be handled by non-nationals and, arguably,
with less supervision than in the Negotiation Regime. Clearly, this could
make states more uncomfortable with the International Adjudication
Regime.
D. Supranational Court Regime
The final regime currently used in the international trading system
is the Supranational Court Regime best exemplified by the European
Union. Under this regime, individuals are directly granted rights under
the trade agreement (and EU legislation) and have standing to bring
cases to protect these rights in their domestic courts, if not the European
Court of Justice. The rulings of the ECJ have supremacy over national
law and are often integrated into the domestic law by the use of national
court references. The procedures of the Supranational Court Regime are
well-understood and its decisions are regularly published providing ex-
cellent transparency. Finally, enforcement under this regime is the most
stringent of all types of regimes since domestic courts are used to
I.C.J. 50 (Oct. 11, 1991) (examples of two current ICJ cases where non-democratic states
have brought cases).
272. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying discussion.
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enforce the law. Additionally, the use of damages has provided real
punishment for states not adhering to the law.
1. Concerns Over Sovereignty
The Supranational Court Regime asks member states for the great-
est relinquishment of sovereignty in a number of ways. First, the
member state gives up sovereignty to the supranational court, which has
supremacy over domestic courts. Second, the member state gives up
sovereignty from the executive branch, which previously controlled
trade policy, to the judiciary-both domestic and international. Third,
the member state relinquishes its centralized power to its citizens by
granting private actors rights and remedies under this regime. When
trying to craft a new international trade regime, each of these forfeitures
of sovereignty can be nerve-wracking at best and deal-breaking at worst.
Under the Supranational Court Regime, unlike under other regimes,
the state loses virtually all power to "exit"-not comply with a rule. In
exchange, it retains "voice" because it can influence what laws are
passed under the trade agreement. Yet even here, the extent of the eco-
nomic integration promoted by the regime works to erode the separate
"voice" of the member state. Under this regime, the best explanation of
state behavior relies on Hirschman's definition of "loyalty" where states
find that the general advantages of the organization are worth the loss of
voice and exit. One only has to look at the history of the EU and the
goals of economic integration to understand the impact that "loyalty"
may have. The visionaries of the Treaty of Rome sought to prevent an-
other Franco-German war, to tie Germany into Europe, and to bolster
the Western European economy in the face of communism.
Furthermore, where "loyalty" exists, states choose to remain in the
organization and change it from within rather than leave. The history of
change in the EU demonstrates this hypothesis since it is the member
states that have worked in the last fifteen years to change the focus and
dynamics of the EU. Furthermore, the example of the United Kingdom
and Denmark's opting out of some of these changes demonstrates both
the sovereignty concerns of losing "voice" and "exit."
2. Type of International Organization
A Supranational Court Regime is part of an international organiza-
tion that is at the far end of the range from facilitation to producing. An
organization that is highly producing-high levels of norm coordina-
tion, centralization, and independence-will prefer a dispute resolution
regime that complements these intentions. A Supranational Court Re-
gime has the ability to provide the highest level of rule centralization
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and coordination through its oversight and enforcement of the trade
rules. This regime centralizes the interpretation and application of the
underlying treaty rules. Rather than leaving each state to interpret the
law or leaving interpretation to ad hoc panels, the supranational court is
the central and supreme interpreter of the law. Furthermore, the en-
forcement through the domestic system under a Supranational Court
Regime ensures an even higher level of compliance.
A supranational court also maintains a high level of legitimacy. In
its role as arbiter, the supranational court is respected for its high levels
of autonomy and independence.2 7 ' A court can act as an enforcer in ad-
dition to the monitoring role it plays through its case load. Instead of
acting solely as a manager of state-to-state enforcement, it has an addi-
tional level of enforcement-the ability to provide punishments on its
own.
3. Goals of the Economic Organization
A Supranational Court Regime only becomes necessary when a high
level of economic integration is desired. While we could argue that the
Supranational Court Regime would be useful even at lower levels of
economic integration, it is clearly necessary when issues beyond simple
tariff relief are involved. When the member states choose to coordinate
their economies to the extent that the EU has and create a common mar-
ket, it is apparent that some federal structures must be created. As the
goals of integration begin to include movement of people, capital, and
services, in addition to the free movement of goods, the importance of
integrating this law into the domestic fabric with supremacy becomes
more pressing. Similarly, it is equally important to involve individuals
in protecting the array of rights and concerns covered by an agreement
establishing such a high level of integration.
4. Number of States
As the EU continues to expand, the question of the optimal number
of states under this regime becomes of current, not just hypothetical,
importance. The structures required for a Supranational Court Regime
could be overburdened by a global membership. The ECJ would no
doubt need further screening mechanisms for cases or additional lower
273. "Courts as independent institutions also formulate and express community policy.
By enunciating, elaborating, and applying rules publicly, they educate the community and
strengthen underlying norms." Why States Act, supra note 155, at 25 (citing Kenneth Abbott,
GATTas a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond, 31 BROOKLYN J. OF INT'L L.
31 (1992)).
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courts. At the other extreme, such an elaborate structure would be un-
necessary for a bilateral or trilateral agreement.
5. Similarity of Economic and Social Levels
Because of the level of harmonization required under this regime, it
is probably better if the member states have somewhat similar economic
levels. And while it is clear that the states in the EU vary significantly,274
these states are all considered to be of the First World rather than the
Third World. Even the requirements for new members coming from
Eastern Europe set certain standards of economic and social develop-
ment before integration in the EU is possible. Arguably, the areas in
which the EU is having the most trouble (i.e. free movement of labor
and open borders) are the areas where the member states differ most
from one another in terms of levels of employment, wages and bene-
fits.
275
6. Government Type and Legal Culture
Again, we can look to the EU to provide a current example of what
is required under this regime. New members in the EU must have a
democratic form of government. Not only does this advance the overall
goals of the EU in securing a democratic continent and peaceable
neighbors, this also makes sense in terms of the structure of the EU. A
regime which provides individual rights, standing for private actors, and
relies on respect of the judiciary must be comprised of states which hold
those values in high regard at the domestic level. The structures and
procedures of a Supranational Court Regime would clearly be frustrated
by member states which did not permit their. citizens such powers
vis-A-vis domestic structures and were not willing to relinquish their
sovereignty to their citizens.
The Supranational Court Regime relies the most of any of the re-
gimes on the skill and involvement of private lawyers. The involvement
of domestic lawyers in strengthening the EU system is obvious to most
EU observers. Again, the provision of rights and standing to private ac-
274. For example the gross domestic product per inhabitant in 1997 ranged from
33,035 ECU in Luxembourg to 8,919 ECU in Portugal. The average was 18,983 ECU. Euro-
pean Union web server (last visited Oct. 16, 1999) <http://europa.eu.int/ en/ comm/ eurostat/
indic/indic 16.htm>.
275. See Kimberly Green, Labor Standards in the European Union: The Effects on
Multinationals, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 497, 498-518 (1996) (discussing the harmonization of
standards under the EU's Social Charter and Protocol on Social Policy). Unemployment rates
as of August 1998 averaged 10 percent in the EU ranging from 18.7% in Spain to 2.2% in




tors can only be utilized with the cooperation of lawyers in each of the
member states who are adept at bringing cases to both the domestic and
supranational courts.2 76 The right of representation in the Supranational
Court Regime is of paramount importance in assuring that legitimate
cases are pursued regardless of a state's interest in bringing the case. As
new states join the EU, it is important that their domestic lawyers are
trained sufficiently in order to take full advantage of this regime. With-
out a core of lawyers who understand the procedures of the
Supranational Court Regime, this regime would not be as effective in
promoting the harmonization goals of the organization.
V. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
An analysis of the four types of regimes of dispute resolution would
not be complete without recognizing some of the weaknesses of this
type of organization and the methodology chosen. There are at least four
flaws with discussing dispute resolution regimes in this way. First, these
regimes are only based on international trade organizations. Second, the
evolution of these international trade organizations is an ongoing proc-
ess. In particularly examining the WTO and NAFTA at this stage of
development may be premature. Third, the political and economic vari-
ables are all treated equally in the analysis to help determine an
appropriate regime. Finally, the analysis of the legal factors and politi-
cal variables assumes that these factors are taken into account at the
time of negotiating the original trade agreement. In fact, the legal fac-
tors such as supremacy or direct effect may evolve over time and well
beyond the original intention as we have seen, for example, in the EU.
A. Only International Trade Agreements Used
While this study has limited itself to trade agreements for simplicity
and cohesiveness, one could clearly argue that not including human
rights organizations or other types of international organizations makes
the analysis somewhat problematic. After all, human rights regimes such
as the European Convention on Human Rights,277 the Inter-American
276. See, e.g., Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Publicity in the European Union: Bans are Re-
moved But Barriers Remain, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 381 (1995) (discussing the
practice of lawyers in each member state).
277. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 234-48 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); see generally J.
G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 1993).
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Convention on Human Rights,278 the African Charter of Human
Rights,279 and the International Labor Organization 28" all deal with the
legal factors set forth in section II. Each of these regimes has debated
and decided issues of direct effect, standing, supremacy, transparency,
and enforcement. It would clearly be revealing to study the differences
between these human rights regimes and to reflect upon the political and
economic variables of their respective memberships. 28' Arguably, the
lessons from these regimes would be helpful for international trade and
should not be overlooked. A full study of regimes would also include
282 283the new Law of the Sea regime, environmental treaties, and perhaps
look at security or general regional organizations as well.
278. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 52-73, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, 157-61 (discussing the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Chapter 8
of the Convention). See Dinah Shelton, The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 333 (1994).
279. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Articles 47-54 of the Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc.
CABILEG/67/3/Rev. 5 21 I.L.M. 58, 65-66 (1981) (entered into force Oct 21, 1986). See
Rose M. D'Sa, Human and Peoples' Rights: Distinctive Features of the African Charter, 29
J. AFR. L. 72 (1985).
280. The International Labor Organization (ILO) utilizes a tripartite system divided
into government, employment, and labor to promote the global recognition of human and
labor rights. The governing body consists of 28 government members, 14 employer mem-
bers, and 14 worker members. Committees and delegations for annual conferences are
similarly structured. The ILO is unique in allowing organizations of employers or workers to
allege non-compliance complaints against the contracting states. Although private individu-
als are not allowed direct access without the backing of an established organization, the
democratic process is strengthened by the employers' and workers' involvement. See How to
Reform the UN, supra note 221, at 433-34 (commenting that the increase of private individ-
ual participation "reflect[s] the democratic functions of international liberal rules and
organizations for the participation of individual rights"). See generally HECTOR BARTOLOMEI
DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 3 (1996) (providing an
overview of the ILO procedures).
281. See, e.g., Heifer and Slaughter, supra note 25, (drawing lessons from Europe for
the UN).
282. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122, S. Treaty Doc. No. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), 21
I.L.M. 1261. As a guiding principle, the parties to a dispute can agree to select any dispute
settlement method they wish. If the parties cannot agree to a method of settlement, then more
complex provisions of the Convention apply. See, e.g., Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Should
UNCLOS or GATJ/WTO Decide Trade and Environment Disputes?, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 287 (1998); Jonathan I. Charney, The Implications of Expanding International Dis-
pute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 69
(1996).
283. See Janet McDonald, Trade and the Environment: Greening the GATT: Harmo-
nizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L.
397, 457 (1993); Chris Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT: Con-
flict and Resolution? 26 ENVTL. L. 841, 858 (1996); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shifting the Point
of Regulation: The International Organization for Standardization and Global Lawmaking
on Trade and the Environment, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 484 (1995).
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Moreover, focusing only on international trade casts the political
and economic variables through an economic interest prism. Arguably,
states would be willing to give up some sovereignty for security, as in
NATO, but they may not be willing to relinquish sovereignty for eco-
nomic reasons. Then again, states might be willing to trade some
sovereignty for clear economic benefit and might not be willing to give
up sovereignty in the human rights arena. We must recognize that these
regimes and the choices behind them are merely snapshots and may not
be characteristic of all decisions or all organizations.
B. International Trade Organizations are New Organizations
Another problem with the regime analysis set forth is that it is based
on some organizations that have existed for less than a decade. While
we could write about the Negotiation Regime and the Supranational
Court Regime ten years ago, the International Adjudication Regime
really did not exist prior to the WTO and the Investment Arbitration
Regime was rarely used. Therefore, we are relying on relatively few
years and few cases in order to make determinations about these re-
gimes, describe how they operate, and explore the motivations of the
member states participating in them. The WTO is already debating
changes to its dispute resolution system. NAFTA may well be sub-
215sumed in the FTAA, if it ever comes to fruition.
On the other hand, this remarkable evolution is exactly what makes
this study so interesting. We are witnessing a dramatic change in how
disputes are resolved. There is no doubt that the WTO and NAFTA will
continue to evolve as will the EU, MERCOSUR, and other new organi-
zations. Therefore, we must again recognize that this study is a snapshot
of international dispute resolution regimes today. We should expect
continued change and growth in international trade.
C. All Factors Have Equal Weight
This analysis of the dispute resolution regimes has treated both the
legal factors and the political variables as equally important within each
group. This equal treatment is probably problematic in three ways. First,
in selecting the type of dispute resolution regime, some of the legal
factors are more important than others. For example, direct effect
284. See e.g. Menyasz, supra note 225; WTO Begins Contentious Talks on Reform of
Dispute Resolution Rules; Delays Expected, 15 INT'.L TRADE REP. 1788 (Oct. 28, 1998);
Daniel Pruzin, Four Nations Submit Proposals to Reform WTO Dispute Settlement Process,
15 INT'L TRADE REP. 2024 (Dec. 2, 1998); USTR Will Seek to Clarify WTO Rules on Dispute
Settlement at Ministerial Meeting, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 137 (Jan. 27, 1999).
285. See O'Hop, supra note 115; Essay in Trade Governance, supra note 8.
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distinguishes the Supranational Court Regime more than any of the
other legal factors and may influence its choice of that regime. The lack
of enforcement distinguishes the Negotiation Regime from the other
three. And, while transparency is important, it is probably not as im-
portant as the other factors when determining which regime to choose.
Second, certain political and economic variables are probably more
important than others for states that are negotiating over a dispute reso-
lution regime. A concern over sovereignty may result in a Negotiation
Regime despite the existence of other factors that would point to the
selection of other types of regimes. States with a limited economic
agenda may choose an Investor Arbitration Regime regardless of the
number of states or the type of government involved.
Third, some of the factors are linked. Standing for private actors
presupposes that private actors are granted rights. Similarly, we can
only discuss effective enforcement once we have assumed supremacy
and compliance. This linkage of variables also occurs in the political
and economic arena. It is clearly more likely that democratic states will
have lawyers better trained in using an independent court system. Simi-
larly, states with free market economies are more likely to have a higher
economic and social development level. Thus, treating the legal factors
or the political variables separately may grant them too much independ-
ence and importance.
D. Assume Factors Evaluated During Original Negotiations
The final flaw in this analysis may well be that this study assumes
that states know in advance how far their regimes will evolve. We can
clearly learn from the history of the EU that states may not, and proba-
bly cannot, evaluate fully their dispute resolution options because these
regimes will change over time. For instance, only after the Van Gend en
Loos decision in 1963, was it clear that the EU was going to provide
direct effect of treaty rights. Supremacy was not confirmed until a year
later in the Costa v. ENEL decision. These decisions occurred five and
six years respectively after the creation of the EEC and began the con-
stitutionalization of the EU. We may or may not see that type of
evolution in MERCOSUR, NAFTA, and the WTO. Furthermore,
NAFTA and the WTO may also play off one another in that there is in-
116teraction between the two systems. Parties have a choice of the forum
in which to bring a claim. Instead of stronger enforcement guidelines
under NAFTA between the states, the parties left open the option of
286. See, e.g., Michael S. Valihora, NAFTA Chapter 19 or the WTO's Dispute Settle-
ment Body: Hobson's Choice For Canada? 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L., 447 (1998).
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going to the WTO, except in cases where the NAFTA standards are
stronger (i.e. environmental) or controversial (the 3rd party to NAFTA
would prefer the case under NAFTA)2 '
Of course, we could assume that states that wish to limit the direct
effect or supremacy of their dispute resolution regime can do so. On the
other hand, as we compare the EU and the Supranational Court Regime
with the Investment Arbitration Regime and the International Adjudica-
tion Regime, we should recognize that those regimes are in their
comparative infancy. Arguably, if we compared the EU in 1963 with
NAFTA and the WTO today, that would be a more valid comparison of
the states' intentions in creating a dispute resolution regime.
CONCLUSION
Now that the analysis of the dispute resolution regimes has been
started, the question remains what do we do with the information gath-
ered. One step is to complete further analysis dealing with some of the
weaknesses outlined above in this initial study. For example, we could
weigh factors differently and spend time specifically analyzing which
factors are important to which states during the negotiation of the dis-
pute resolution regime. We should continue to analyze the EU and how
its evolution reflects the weight of the legal factors involved in selecting
a regime and the importance of each of the political variables to that
selection as well. This in-depth study could shed more practical light on
some of the theoretical assumptions concerning the relationship of the
political variables to the appropriate dispute resolution regime. Fur-
thermore, this kind of examination of the evolution of the EU might
help shed additional light on how the WTO, NAFTA, or MERCOSUR
might evolve in the future.
We should continue to compare dispute resolution regimes across
subject matter. As discussed above, the variety of regimes and the
varying levels of effectiveness of human rights organizations could pro-
vide additional insight into the political and economic variables at stake
when creating dispute resolution regimes, as well as the relative impor-
tance of the legal factors to choosing these regimes.
Finally any of the factors or variables could be studied more
closely. Additional legal factors could also be added to flesh out further
differences (i.e. whether the dispute resolution body was rotating or
standing) or additional political variables could be examined, such as
the power of certain domestic interest groups. My hope in presenting
287. See NAFTA, supra note 2.
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this analysis is to create an initial template of different types of dispute
resolution regimes from which we can start to better understand the
similarities and differences, as well as the advantages and disadvantages
of each regime.
This article does not conclude by exalting one of the theories dis-
cussed over the others; the value of an analysis using each of them
should be clear. An economic analysis as to why states join international
organizations and how dispute resolution may be based upon those de-
sires is crucial, yet insufficient. The level of economic integration and
the structure of the organization are affected by other factors such as
domestic concerns with sovereignty, history, type of government, rela-
tions between the member states and the goals of improving foreign
policy, and the desire to stabilize one's own or neighboring govern-
ments and economies. All of these variables should enter into any
calculation of organizations and dispute resolution. An appropriate re-
view of these variables is necessary before either undertaking the design
of a new dispute resolution mechanism or the reform of an existing one.
One theory, from political science, economics or traditional legal analy-
sis, is only one side of a multifaceted decision.
It is also too simplistic to expect just one theory to explain the
existence of any given regime. For example, a Negotiation Regime
could be established due to any one of several variables. A more power-
ful state might refuse to yield its advantages. In a treaty between only
two or three states, member states might decide a more complicated
dispute resolution mechanism is not necessary. Finally, there could be
domestic concerns with sovereignty which prevent involvement in a
more constitutional regime, something that happens in the United
States. In terms of explaining the Supranational Court Regime at the
other end of the continuum, it is not a story of one theory triumphing
over the others. To reach this level of constitutionalization, all of the
variables from each of the multidisciplinary theories must be present. In
the EU, there was a desire for significant economic integration-for
economic gains, political stability and foreign policy goals. There was a
desire for a highly producing organization which, at the time, was not as
concerned with the loss in sovereignty as it was with reigning in the ex-
cesses of sovereignty. All of these variables need to be present in order
to arrive at a Supranational Court Regime.
By examining organizations in this way, it becomes easy to see
which variables are then missing in other organizations and why other
regimes evolve. For example, MERCOSUR ostensibly establishes an
organization pursuing a high level of economic integration, desiring
political stability, and having the potential for economic gain. We can
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see, however, the missing variables. The problem in MERCOSUR is
clearly on the domestic level of each member state, with the type of
each government, the legal and political culture, and each state's con-
cerns with sovereignty. These variables, based on the history and
politics of the states, are weighted more than economic goals at this
point. Lack of one or two of these variables then explains why states
choose not to move along the continuum of constitutionalization. In or-
der to move along in terms of legal factors, states need the coalescing of
all of the political, economic and social variables that are brought forth
by the multidisciplinary theories explained in this article.
As more and more regional organizations are created, this analysis
of dispute resolution regimes could provide useful guidelines, if not an-
swers, about how the states might choose to set up a dispute resolution
regime. Recognizing some of the legal differences between the dispute
resolution regimes might encourage clearer debate about the advantages
and disadvantages of each of the regimes. Similarly, candid review of
the political and economic variables between the member states could
encourage states to evaluate the weight of each of the variables and to
make clearer decisions about their priorities in setting up a dispute
resolution regime.
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